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Asian carrier navies do not suffer from the technocratic tendencies that afflict the United 
States. Each carrier program examined by this paper is designed to meet specific strategic 
problems. China’s intentions remain largely obscured leading to a fair amount of 
speculation concerning the role of People’s Liberation Army Navy carriers. China’s 
involvement in regional maritime territorial disputes and its strategic interpretation of 
Western Pacific geography suggest that any investment in naval power projection 
instruments will support a desire for operational freedom of action within the First Island 
Chain. India recognized the utility of strike carriers early in its post-colonial history and 
recently articulated its intention to achieve regional manifest destiny in the face of 
increasing naval competition from China. India’s vision suffers from some of the same 
diffuseness of the U.S. model that it attempts to emulate but is simultaneously easier to 
manage because of its smaller scope and acknowledged adversaries. Japan’s gradual 
revival as a regional military power may have been inevitable in the absence of the Soviet 
threat and the U.S. regional engagement that accompanied it, but China’s increasingly 
assertive actions over island territories has accelerated the Japanese Maritime Self-
Defense Force’s development into a limited power projection force. Finally, South 
Korea—while not yet committed to fixed-wing carrier acquisition—is likely exploring 
options for managing its precarious position between North Korea, China, and Japan. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE EASTERN REJECTION AND 
CONTEMPORARY REVIVAL OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
In a 2011 article titled “Twilight of the $UPERfluous Carrier,” Henry J. Hendrix 
and J. Noel Williams declared,  
Given very clear technology trends toward precision long-range strike and 
increasingly sophisticated anti-access and area-denial capabilities, high-
signature, limited-range combatants like the current aircraft carrier will not 
meet the requirements of tomorrow’s [U.S. Navy] Fleet. In short, the 
march of technology is bringing the supercarrier era to an end, just as the 
new long-range strike capabilities of carrier aviation brought on the 
demise of the battleship era in the 1940s.1  
Hendrix and Williams are not alone in this sentiment. Western naval observers are 
increasingly suspicious of the carrier’s relevancy in the twenty-first century. Articles such 
as “Aircraft Carriers: R.I.P?” and “Shipping Out: Are Aircraft Carriers Becoming 
Obsolete?” continue to debate the paradox of maintaining large, expensive vessels in the 
growing age of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) weapons and shrinking defense 
budgets.2 In January 2014, Christopher P. Cavas created ripples in U.S. naval circles by 
reporting that “indications are growing that the elimination of one carrier and one carrier 
air wing could be among the [fiscal year 2015 defense budget] request’s key features.”3 
Although many Western observers seem sure of the carrier’s demise, navies on 
the other side of the Pacific do not share their pessimism. Japan commissioned two 
Hyuga-class helicopter destroyers (DDH) from 2009 to 2011 and launched the first ship 
of the larger Izumo-class in January 2013. China commissioned its first aircraft carrier—
                                                 
1 Henry J. Hendrix and J. Noel Williams, “Twilight of the $UPERfluous Carrier,” Proceedings, May 
2011, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-05/twilight-uperfluous-carrier.  
2 Robert Farley, “Aircraft Carriers: R.I.P?” The Diplomat, March 14, 2013, 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/aircraft-carriers-r-i-p/; Robert Haddick, “Shipping Out: Are Aircraft 
Carriers Becoming Obsolete?” Foreign Policy, August 31, 2012, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/31/shipping_out. 
3 Christopher P. Cavas, “Carrier Cut Could Be Back on the Table,” Defensenews, January 26, 2014, 
http://www.defensenews.com/.   
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the refurbished ex-Soviet hull Liaoning—in 2011, and a provincial Communist Party 
secretary announced in January 2014 that construction is underway on a new, indigenous 
carrier design. In August 2013, India christened its first indigenous carrier—Vikrant—
through the Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC) Program and commissioned the ex-Soviet 
Vikramaditya in November: ships that augment India’s aging ex-British Viraat. Finally, a 
2013 South Korean feasibility study examined options for converting Dokdo-class 
landing platform ships into fixed-wing vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) carriers and 
constructing two light aircraft carriers between 2028 and 2036.4 
Why are navies in East and South Asia initiating carrier acquisition programs and 
what is the purpose of these ships? Are they simply manifestations of nationalist pride? 
Are India, Japan, and South Korea responding to China’s aggressive naval modernization 
in a version of the classic security dilemma? This thesis will address these questions 
through critical examination of each of the four navies in question and the larger strategic 
environment in which they operate. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The Asian carrier race is indicative of the evolving naval strategic environment in 
the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Most Asian states have long refrained from 
investing in carriers, but the growing importance of these ships in the region suggests that 
the security needs of Asian states now require the ability to project power beyond the 
reach of land-based aircraft. The reasons behind these changes have important 
implications for regional powers and the globally committed United States. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Some observers are enchanted with the idea that Asian carriers are excellent 
platforms for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions in the disaster 
prone Asia-Pacific, but such speculation fails to justify the significant investment of 
resources and effort required to build, maintain, supply, and operate aircraft carriers. The 
                                                 
4 Wendell Minnick, “Experts Wary Over News of China’s 2nd Carrier,” Defensenews, January 25, 
2014, http://www.defensenews.com/; Jung Sung-Ki, “S. Korea Envisions Light Aircraft Carrier,” 
Defensenews.com, October 26, 2013, http://www.defensenews.com/.  
 3 
acquisition costs alone are staggering. In 1999, Ken E. Gause listed the initial costs of 
Spain’s Principe de Asturias, France’s Charles de Gaulle, and a single vessel of the 
United States’ Nimitz-class as $285 million, $3.4 billion, and $5 billion respectively. The 
air wings added billions more.5 In addition, Gause correctly notes, “to have a viable 
carrier capability, a navy needs to have more than one to assure that one is always 
operational.”6 
The HADR argument also fails to acknowledge the historic roots of carrier-based 
aviation: long-range power projection. Primarily, all of these ships are intended to serve 
a combat role. It is hard, however, to fault observers for settling on non-traditional 
missions to explain Asia’s aspiring carrier navies. With the exception of Imperial Japan 
and post-colonial India, Eastern navies have traditionally struggled with the offensive, 
power projection concept of Western carriers. Until recently, the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) was a small, coastal defense force that regarded carriers with 
suspicion as tools of Western imperialism. Meanwhile, the Soviet Navy never committed 
to a pure carrier design. Soviet interest in carriers did not gain real traction until 1958 
when—motivated by the threat posed by U.S. Polaris submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles—the government approved Project 1123. This was a doctrinally defensive class 
of ships that Valery Marinin and Valery Polyakov describe as “helicopter-carrying 
antisubmarine cruisers.”7 Although designed to carry 14 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
helicopters, the two ships produced by Project 1123—Moskva and Leningrad—also 
carried anti-submarine missile systems, rocket launchers, and torpedo tubes, indicating 
that the class was not intended to employ the air wing as its sole or even primary weapon 
system. The 1967 follow-on design, Project 1143, retained the Soviet Navy’s attachment 
to traditional surface combatant functions. Designated as heavy aircraft carrying 
                                                 
5 Gause lists the cost of Principe de Asturias’s air wing as $65 million, Charles de Gaulle’s as $998 
million, and Nimitz’s as $3 billion. Ken E. Gause, “Considerations for 21st Century Carrier Navies,” in 
Maritime Aviation: Light and Medium Aircraft Carriers into the Twenty First Century, ed. Peter Hore and 
Thomas J. Hirschfeld (Hull, UK: University of Hull Press, 1999), 195–6. 
6 Ibid., 197. 
7 Valery Y. Marinin and Valery N. Polyakov, “The Russian Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Programmes,” in 
Maritime Aviation: Light and Medium Aircraft Carriers into the Twenty First Century, ed. Peter Hore and 
Thomas J. Hirschfeld (Hull, UK: University of Hull Press, 1999), 48.  
 4 
cruisers, Project 1143’s Kiev and Minsk sported eight anti-ship cruise missile launchers, 
two medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, and several 76mm and 30mm guns in 
addition to anti-submarine weapons and Yak-38 VTOL attack aircraft. Successive Soviet 
projects never abandoned the odd, forced marriage of carrier, cruiser, and destroyer 
functions, which survived until 1991 when the break-up of the Soviet Union halted 
construction on Varyag: the second ship of the Kuznetsov-class that sails today as 
China’s Liaoning.8 As late as 1999, Russian thought continued to regard carriers as 
defensive platforms. Marinin and Polyakov considered carriers “necessary to enable the 
[Russian] navy to ensure the security of the country in littoral waters,” and Gause 
paraphrased Admiral Vladimir Chernavin’s explanation that the Kuznetsov-class’s “main 
role was to serve as a platform for fighter aircraft to provide long-range cover for ships 
when they sailed beyond the range of shore based fighters.”9 
The Royal Thai Navy’s (RTN) Chakrai Naruebet, East Asia’s first new carrier 
since the end of the Second World War, has not improved Western impressions of Asian 
carrier aspirations. Built by Spain and commissioned into the RTN in 1997, Chakrai 
Naruebet and its AV-8S Matador vertical/short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft 
were part of Thailand’s naval modernization program of the 1990s. During the Cold War, 
the RTN was confined to a coastal defense force that relied on small World War II-era 
ships and patrol craft. According to RTN Captain Kiatiyut Tiansuwan, the post-Cold War 
emergence of non-traditional military threats such as insurgency, terrorism, transnational 
crime, illegal immigration, and environmental destruction forced the RTN to venture 
farther out to sea. In addition, China’s growing military capabilities and activities in 
Southeast Asia became a concern. Anticipation of facing a combination of traditional and 
non-traditional threats prompted the acquisition of modernized and expanded naval 
capabilities including Chinese and U.S. frigates, Singaporean amphibious ships, and 
Chakrai Naruebet. Unfortunately for the RTN, Thailand was hit hard by the 1997 Asian 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 48–51. 
9 Marinin and Polyakov, “The Russian Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Programmes,” 54;  Kenneth Gause, 
“Characteristics of Current Small and Medium Aircraft Carriers,” in Maritime Aviation: Light and Medium 
Aircraft Carriers into the Twenty First Century, ed. Peter Hore and Thomas J. Hirschfeld (Hull, UK: 
University of Hull Press, 1999), 250. 
 5 
Economic Crisis, and warming relations with China resulted in a new 1998 Thai National 
Defense Policy that discounted the likelihood of future external threats. By 2003, 
observers reported that only one or two of the RTN’s AV-8Ss were still in operation, and 
the entire AV-8S fleet was grounded in 2006. Chakrai Naruebet is now relegated to 
disaster relief, search and rescue, economic exclusion zone (EEZ) patrols, and 
transportation of the Thai royal family, a role for which the ship maintains a set of royal 
quarters. None of these roles, however, require an aircraft carrier, and continuing budget 
problems cast doubt on Chakrai Naruebet’s revival. Jokingly nicknamed “Thai-tanic” 
and “a glorified royal yacht,” the ship now spends an average of 29 out of every 30 days 
in port.10  
Given the Soviet Union and China’s traditional disinterest in offensive carrier 
power projection and the defanging of Chakrai Naruebet, the prospects for future Asian 
carriers looked bleak at the turn of the century. In 1998, however, China, a leading 
producer of the A2/AD technologies that call the utility of western carriers into question, 
proceeded with plans to purchase Varyag from Ukraine and ushered in a new round of 
Asian carrier development. Research indicates that each state in the new carrier race is 
pursuing modernization programs tailored to their unique security challenges. For India, 
Japan, and South Korea, China’s naval modernization represents a common threat, but 
individual security requirements also influence each state’s approach.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In Asia’s Naval Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making?, Geoffrey Till provides 
a critical framework for considering the strategic environment by asking a necessary 
question: is Asia experiencing “one race or many?”11 It appears that many races are 
                                                 
10 Hunter Lanzaro, “Air Power at Sea: The World’s Aircraft Carriers,” Sea Classics 45, no. 12 (2012): 
24, ProQuest Research Library (1115582930); Walter Hickey and Robert Johnson, “These Are the 20 
Aircraft Carriers In Service Today,” Business Insider, August 9, 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-
20-in-service-aircraft-carriers-patrolling-the-world-today-2012-8?op=1; Naval Modernization in Southeast 
Asia: Nature, Causes, Consequences (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2011), 13; 
Jason Warren, “The Royal Thai Navy,” Naval Forces 26, no. 5 (2005): 32–5, ProQuest Research Library  
(199351111); Gause, “Considerations for 21st Century Carrier Navies,” 182. 
11 Geoffrey Till, Asia’s Naval Expansion: An Arms Race in the Making? (London: The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), 42.  
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underway, but each contributes to the larger strategic context. Till describes the North 
and South Korean relationship as the “most deadly” naval rivalry in the region given the 
Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents of 2010, which drives the primacy of the 
North Korean threat in ROKN acquisition programs.
12
 However, Japan is primarily 
focused on China’s naval build-up because of “absolute economic and strategic reliance 
on the sea lines of communication that go through the East and South China seas” in 
addition to Chinese assertiveness around the Senkaku Islands.
13
 In the meantime, India is 
walking a thin line between China and Pakistan. Till argues India is hedging against the 
possibility of conflict with both states, but capabilities that hedge against one often illicit 
a reaction from the other. “Maritime frictions,” writes Till, “demonstrate that mutual trust 
between the two countries [India and Pakistan] remains in short supply, further 
complicating the naval balance between India and China.”14 
Importantly, Till ties the various arms races into a single strategic package: “From 
Beijing’s perspective, a particularly worrying aspect of all of this (and hence a great 
incentive to develop its naval forces) is the extent to which this hedging process seems to 
end with China as the common denominator.”15 While South Korea, and Japan to a lesser 
extent, hedges against North Korea, and India hedges against Pakistan, the naval 
programs of Japan, South Korea, and India serve as a collective hedge against China: a 
situation that Till describes as Beijing’s “the rest versus China” dilemma.16 
Are regional concerns about China’s naval build-up warranted? Although light on 
specific intentions, China’s biennial defense white papers (DWP) provide important 
indications of Chinese strategic trajectory. Concerning China’s international security 
outlook, the DWPs from 2004 thru 2010 used relatively passive language. In 2012, 
however, the language took a sharper tone by indicating an intention to “participate in 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 44. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 46. 
16 Ibid., 47. 
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regional and international security affairs.”17 In addition, maritime security interests have 
assumed a progressively greater place in Chinese defense policy. In 2012, maritime 
interests became essential to Chinese national strategy: “It is an essential national 
development strategy to exploit, utilize and protect the seas and oceans, and build China 
into a maritime power. It is an important duty for the PLA to resolutely safeguard China’s 
maritime rights and interests.”18 China’s increasingly assertive language and recognition 
of both regional and global maritime economic interests suggest a growing need for a 
modern and capable navy.  
Given the lack of transparency, it is appropriate to consider each of the individual 
roles that PLAN carriers could fill. In “Beijing’s Starter Carrier and Future Steps: 
Alternatives and Implications,” Andrew Erickson, Abraham Denmark, and Gabriel 
Collins offer six possibilities: security of China’s sea lines-of-communication (SLOC) 
against low-intensity threats, extended-range power projection along China’s SLOCs, 
humanitarian relief, support for a Taiwan scenario, offensive power projection over 
disputed maritime territory, and power projection beyond the so-called First Island 
Chain.19 The first four roles, while possible, are not probable. The last two roles, 
however, show more promise. When considered alongside statements from China’s 




In Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to America’s 
Maritime Strategy, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes depict PLAN modernization 
as a carefully tailored response to Chinese strategic requirements. They argue that the 
PLAN will act as a sea denial force seeking to exercise localized sea control “for a finite 
                                                 
17 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China’s 2012 Defense White Paper: The 
Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, 2013), 6. 
18 Ibid. 
19 The First Island Chain is a conceptual line running from Japan to Singapore through the islands of 
Taiwan, Luzon, and Borneo. The Second Island Chain runs from Japan to New Guinea through Guam. For 
more information, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrine-offshore.htm.  
20 Andrew S. Erickson, Abraham M. Denmark, and Gabriel Collins, “Beijing’s Starter Carrier and 
Future Steps: Alternatives and Implications,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 1 (2012): 36-40. 
 8 
interval, until the nation’s strategic objectives are in hand.”21 Heavily influenced by 
Maoist traditions, the PLAN, supported by land-based forces, will maintain the tactical 
offensive to keep other navies off balance as part of a strategic defense. This argument 
offers revolutionary possibilities for the use of carrier-based power projection, especially 
when considered in combination with A2/AD capabilities, and is an example of breaks 
from traditional American conceptions of power projection.
22
 
Of the four navies examined, India’s naval strategy is the one that most closely 
resembles that of the United States. Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military 
Strategy relies heavily on western naval concepts such as freedom of access, forward 
presence, and shaping operations.
23
 The document even invokes a historically American 
concept: “The freedom to use the seas will become crucial if India is to attain her 
‘manifest destiny.’”24 Published five months before the U.S. sea services’ A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower, the Indian document reflects both shared maritime 
interests and the IN’s traditionally outward-looking strategic thinking. It is far more, 
however, than just an Indian version of its American counterpart. Importantly, Freedom 
to Use the Seas reconciles India’s broad, blue-water strategy with the local, South Asian 
context in four ways. First, it states the purpose of India’s blue-water strategy as “a 
design for relating ends to means:” deterrence—followed by victory in war when 
necessary—is achieved through “a three-dimensional, versatile, blue-water Navy.”25 
Second, it acknowledges China’s naval modernization through a critical lens, noting the 
rise of anti-access weapons and accusing China of encroaching on the Indian Ocean.
26
 
Third, it identifies the most likely arenas for IN combat operations as the Arabian Sea and 
                                                 
21 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge 
to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 73. 
22 Ibid., 73–100. 
23 Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters 
Ministry of Defense (Navy), 2007), iii, 73, 80. 
24 Ibid., 130. 
25 Ibid., 9. 
26 Ibid., 41. 
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the Bay of Bengal.
27
 Finally, it establishes “influencing events on land” as one of the 
primary missions of the IN.
28
 
Carriers, however, are not a recent phenomenon for India. They have played an 
important role in Indian naval strategy since the state’s independence from Great Britain 
in 1947. Although written in 1990, Captain Arun Prakash’s “A Carrier for the Indian 
Navy” provides a useful cultural context for framing India’s well-established attachment 
to carriers. He claims, “That their country had been prey to centuries of invasions and 
conquests, and that final domination by an alien power resulted not from overland 
invasion, but by invasion across her shores, is a racial memory embedded in the Indian 
psyche.”29 Prakash argues that the combination of India’s colonial experience, geographic 
location, and two important events during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war—the carrier 
Vikrant’s contribution to the blockade of East Pakistan and the U.S. attempt to use 
gunboat diplomacy against India—have convinced Indian leaders of the importance of 
maintaining a blue-water navy capable of exercising sea control.
30
  
Collectively, the three editions of Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines 
(NDPG) since 2004 provide a barometer for Japanese strategic perceptions. Four crucial 
themes emerge: the rising importance of China in Japanese security policy, the need to 
restructure the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to meet the challenges of an evolving 
security environment, the JSDF’s force posture in the southwestern region of Japan, and 
the need to defend small offshore islands—presumably the Senkaku Islands—from 
possible invasion. National Defense Program Guidelines: FY 2005- devotes a single 
sentence to the defense of offshore islands.
31
 By the 2014 edition, however, the defense 
of remote islands is mentioned ten times, and the need for capabilities to defend the 
islands from invasion and recapture them in the event that an invasion cannot be stopped 
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 Toward these ends, the two latest NDPGs—coupled with the 
Midterm Defense Program (FY2011–FY2015)—direct the JSDF to transition from the 
post-Cold War Basic Defense Force concept to a new Dynamic Joint Defense Force and 
bolster integrated capabilities in Japan’s southwestern region.33 In addition, National 
Defense Program Guidelines: FY 2014 and Beyond sets three new precedents that 
indicate how far the Chinese threat has driven Japan from its post-1945 pacifism. Japan is 
now developing amphibious capabilities, studying a long-range precision strike option to 
address ballistic missile threats, and reconsidering its self-imposed ban on arms exports.
34
     
Vice Admiral Yoji Koda’s “A New Carrier Race? Strategy, Force Planning, and 
JS Hyuga” provides the necessary historical and cultural context for analysis of Japan’s 
strategic trajectory and the development of new classes of helicopter destroyers. Koda 
describes the U.S.-Japan security alliance within the context of the Cold War as the 
foundation of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (JMSDF) primary identity as 
an anti-submarine and SLOC protection force. Although the JMSDF has long considered 
large deck aviation platforms as a requirement for these roles, post-World War II 
Japanese cultural resistance to offensive capabilities has repeatedly undermined efforts to 
develop ships similar to the new DDH classes. When considered together with the 
increasingly offensive language of the NDPGs, the construction of the new DDHs 
represents a significant shift away from Japan’s traditional pacifist defense policies.35 
The 1994 Prospects for U.S.-Korean Naval Relations in the 21
st
 Century indicates 
that the prospect of aircraft carriers is not new in South Korean strategic thought. The 
document describes Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conference participants eagerly 
considering prospects for a hypothetical reunification of the two Koreas while their 
                                                 
32 National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, 
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Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) counterparts were more concerned with 
the persistent North Korean threat. While the importance of amphibious, mine, and anti-
submarine warfare around the Korean peninsula were debated at length, at least one 
South Korean participant suggested the addition of two light carriers to the ROKN as part 
of a blue-water development plan. Two important points emerge from the ensuing 
discussion. First, the document notes that “most U.S. participants were less enthusiastic 
about having the ROK Navy procure aircraft carriers” because of “the regional 
implications of such a move” regarding China and Japan.36 Second, some South Koreans 
expressed skepticism about the potential range limitations of carrier-based aircraft 
compared to their land-based counterparts. However, U.S. participants countered that 
carriers could be quickly stationed in the Yellow Sea, applying air power against North 
Korean naval threats more directly than air bases on the peninsula. Curiously, CNA 




In 2012, however, the prospect of Korean reunification was no longer high on the 
CNA’s list of concerns. In “Republic of Korea Navy and China’s Rise: Balancing 
Competing Priorities,” CNA analyst Terence Roehrig describes the ROKN’s challenge as 
striking a balance between traditional North Korean threats—highlighted by the 2010 
Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents—and larger regional concerns including 
China’s strategic rise. “The South Korean Navy does not appear to have made any 
specific operational changes in response to its concerns,” Roehrig argues, “but its 
development of a blue water navy continues in part with an eye toward China.”38 Roehrig 
also identifies the Cheonan incident as a turning point in South Korean blue-water 
planning, forcing the ROKN to concede the need to balance coastal defense with regional 
                                                 
36 Christopher D. Yung, Prospects for U.S.-Korean Naval Relations in the 21st Century (Alexandria, 
VA: The Center for Naval Analyses, 1995), 12, https://www.cna.org/research/1995/prospects-us-korean-
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maritime security requirements: “The issue is one of balance, and ROK leaders continue 
to assess and struggle with where to draw the lines between coastal defense and a blue 
water navy to achieve the proper balance.”39 The ROKN’s predicament suggests the need 
for platforms that can serve both peninsular and regional roles. 
In “From Defense to Deterrence: The Core of Defense Reform Plan 307,” Rhee 
Sang-Woo of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analyzes the 
ROK’s strategic shift to proactive deterrence in response to the 2010 North Korean 
provocations and argues that the military superiority necessary for the new doctrine also 
contributes to South Korea’s efforts to convince the North of the necessity for any 
reunification attempt to occur under the banner of a democratic republic.
40
 What can be 
distilled from the South’s strategic predicament? The ROK’s requirements to establish 
military superiority on the peninsula, defend against coastal threats, and maintain some 
semblance of regional relevancy in the face of China’s naval build-up indicates the need 
for credible, multi-purpose, power projection platforms. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The thesis uses a combination of historical and comparative methods. The 
relevant histories of the four navies under examination—PLAN, IN, JMSDF, and 
ROKN—and the regional strategic environment are reviewed to identify evolving 
defense requirements that could justify investment in carrier forces. The thesis uses 
primary sources from regional defense agencies and military branches to identify major 
strategic concerns while secondary sources provide historical and cultural interpretation. 
Finally, analysis of vessel types and capabilities identifies probable strategic and 
operational roles for regional carrier forces. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis consists of six chapters: (I) Introduction, (II) The People’s Liberation 
Army Navy, (III) The Indian Navy, (IV) The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, (V) 
The Republic of Korea Navy, and (VI) Conclusion. To understand the regional naval 
security environment and the role of aircraft carriers within it, the thesis first addresses 
PLAN modernization. The IN is examined second because of India’s outward-looking 
maritime strategy, carrier combat experience, and long-established intention to build a 
capable carrier force. The JMSDF is examined third because of its new capacity to 
support fixed-wing carrier operations despite traditional Japanese resistance to carriers 
and other offensive capabilities since the ratification of the 1947 peace constitution. 
Fourth, the ROKN is examined from a theoretical perspective due to the early stages of 
its feasibility studies. Finally, the sixth chapter draws conclusions that are relative to U.S. 
naval forces and offers alternative perspectives—based on the examination of the four 







THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 15 
II. THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In November 2008, Major General Qian Lihua, director of the Foreign Affairs 
Office of China’s Ministry of Defense, commented on his nation’s growing interest in 
aircraft carriers:  
The question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do 
with your aircraft carrier. Navies of great powers with more than ten 
aircraft carrier battle groups with strategic military objectives have a 
different purpose from countries with only one or two carriers used for 
offshore defense. Even if one day we have an aircraft carrier, unlike 




Qian’s statement clearly contrasts the carrier aspirations of the PLAN against the carrier-
centric U.S. Navy, emphasizing a limited role for a small number of vessels. Such 
statements, however, have not ended the debate surrounding the strategic purpose of 
Chinese carriers and the larger effort to modernize the PLAN. In 2009 the Office of 
Naval Intelligence (ONI) included an artist’s depiction of a potential indigenous Chinese 
carrier design in an assessment titled The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern 
Navy with Chinese Characteristics. The fictional depiction draws heavily on Western 
concepts of modern super-carriers, including multiple steam powered catapults; an angled 
flight deck for aircraft recovery; and a highly capable air wing consisting of multi-role 
fighters, helicopters, and airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. Such mirror imaging 
plays to popular interpretations of China’s global aspirations and military modernization 
as a direct challenge to the United States, but may miss the mark when it comes to 
understanding the direction that the PLAN is heading. As the Liaoning, China’s first 
operational carrier based on an Admiral Kuznetsov-class hull purchased from Ukraine in 
1998, conducts sea trials, and the initial cadre of carrier aviators is trained by the People’s 
Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF), observers anxiously await signs that could 
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clarify China’s intentions. Qian’s question is the key to understanding how carriers fit 
into China’s defense strategy: What does China plan to do with them? Chinese officials 
may not know the answer yet. Western scholars and analysts have offered a spectrum of 
possibilities from humanitarian operations to offensive sea control, but an examination of 
each uncovers potential problems. Given China’s territorial claims and regional maritime 
disputes, it is likely that China’s evolving carrier force will be integrated into a broader 
doctrine of regional power projection beyond the cover of its capable, but geographically 
limited, land-based forces. This chapter examines China’s evolving maritime strategy, 
potential roles for carriers within that strategy, and indicators of the PLAN carrier force’s 
future direction. 
B. CHINA’S EVOLVING MARITIME STRATEGY 
At their core, aircraft carriers are power projection instruments that provide 
flexible options for the pursuit of national objectives. Depending on their configuration 
and the composition of the embarked airwing, carriers are capable of exerting national 
power in a variety of contingencies from HADR to offensive combat operations far from 
the reach of a state’s land-based aircraft. It is now common for a U.S. Navy carrier strike 
group (CSG) to conduct operations as varied as disaster relief, maritime security, strike 
warfare, and gunboat diplomacy on a single deployment. The PLAN, however, is not the 
U.S. Navy. Despite a brief lapse of judgment in using a fictional rendering of a Chinese 
carrier that is unsupported by evidence, ONI concludes that PLAN modernization efforts 
do not represent a desire to establish a global presence of the type exercised by the United 
States. Instead, China’s attention remains focused on East Asia with a growing 
appreciation for its maritime periphery. Still, unless more aircraft carrier theme parks are 
planned, the completion of Liaoning and the announcement of an indigenous carrier 
program indicate that China desires the ability to project power somewhere that is 
currently beyond the reach of the mainland.42  
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Power projection beyond the littoral environment of the Chinese coast is a 
significant break from the PLAN’s traditional role. Until the mid-1980s, the PLAN was 
primarily a coastal defense force that supported army operations when necessary. The 
1927–1950 Chinese civil war, the overlapping Japanese invasion, and the primacy of 
continental threats from Russia and India during the following decades served to relegate 
the PLAN to a tertiary position in Chinese defense strategy behind the PLA and People’s 
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). In 1982, as China became increasingly integrated 
into the globalized world economy, Admiral Liu Huaqing assumed command of the 
PLAN and drove a shift from coastal defense to offshore defense: a term defined by ONI 
as “a regional strategy that does not advocate replicating U.S. or [former] Soviet ‘blue-
water’ naval capabilities. Instead, it calls for naval capabilities suited for China’s specific 
regional maritime interests.”43 Liu, considered the father of the modern PLAN, advocated 
expanded roles beyond coastal waters to secure Chinese economic and territorial 
interests. Aircraft carriers were an integral part of his plan, which he continued to 
promote as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) until 1997.44  
Liu’s tenure at the CMC overlapped with President Jiang Zimen’s 1993 issuance 
of “military guidelines for the new period” that directed the development of offensive sea 
control capabilities to secure economic and maritime territorial claims in addition to 
A2/AD capabilities designed to prevent U.S. intervention in a conflict with Taiwan. In 
2004, President Hu Jintao built upon Jiang’s guidelines and conferred four new 
“historical missions of the armed forces for the new stage in the new century” to the 
PLA: consolidate the ruling status of the Communist Party; help ensure China’s 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security in order to continue national 
development; safeguard China’s expanding national interests; and help maintain world 
peace.45 These broad missions leave significant room for interpretation, but references to 
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sovereignty, territorial integrity, national development, and expanding national interests 
are indicative of a growing awareness of the maritime domain. Consistent with this 
awareness, the RAND Corporation reported in 2009 that “China’s leadership has openly 
stated that the PRC is a central player in the world economy, and that global stability and 
prosperity are intertwined with Chinese national development.”46 
As rare glimpses into an otherwise opaque defense establishment, China’s 
biennial defense white papers (DWP) provide important indications of the PLA’s 
strategic trajectory. Concerning China’s international security outlook, the DWPs from 
2004 thru 2010 used relatively passive language with references to “developing friendly 
relations and strengthening cooperation with other countries” in 2004; “mutual trust, 
mutual benefit, equality, and coordination” in 2006; “developing friendly relations” in 
2008; and “promoting the establishment of equal, mutually beneficial . . . mechanisms for 
military confidence building . . . based on principles of holding consultations on an equal 
footing” in 2010.47 Then, in 2012, the language took a sharper tone:  
China’s armed forces have always been a staunch force upholding world 
peace and regional stability, and will continue to increase cooperation and 
mutual trust with the armed forces of other countries, participate in 
regional and international security affairs, and play an active role in 
international political and security fields.48  
Maritime security interests have also assumed a progressively greater place in 
Chinese defense policy. While explicit reference was omitted in 2004, the 2006 and 2008 
DWPs both refer to “conflicting claims” over maritime territorial rights and interests.49 
The 2010 DWP intensified the maritime rhetoric, stating that “disputes over territorial 
and maritime rights and interests flare up occasionally. . . . Pressure builds up in 
preserving China’s territorial integrity and maritime rights and interests.”50 Finally, in 
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2012, maritime interests became essential to Chinese national strategy: “It is an essential 
national development strategy to exploit, utilize and protect the seas and oceans, and 
build China into a maritime power. It is an important duty for the PLA to resolutely 
safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests.”51 China’s increasingly assertive 
language and recognition of both regional and global maritime economic interests 
suggest a growing need for a modern and capable navy. A2/AD capabilities have obvious 
implications for containing and controlling regional conflict, but the question that 
continues to frustrate scholars is what roles power projection instruments such as aircraft 
carriers will fill in Chinese defense strategy.    
C. ILL-CONVEIVED ROLES FOR PLAN CARRIERS 
Are aircraft carriers all that observers make them out to be, providing China with 
a naval Swiss Army knife that can solve all of their potential maritime problems? The 
answer is maybe, with some common sense caveats. In an article for Naval War College 
Review, Andrew Erickson, Abraham Denmark, and Gabriel Collins respond to arguments 
that the PLAN’s mission will expand beyond the Western Pacific to include humanitarian 
operations, SLOC protection, and naval diplomacy: 
In the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, China has not developed 
high-intensity military capabilities, instead projecting influence in the 
form of peacetime deployments. It is in conjunction with this more distant, 
low-intensity effort that China is likely developing its naval aviation. The 
validity of that strategic assessment would be bolstered by China’s 




It is unclear how they differentiate between high and low-intensity capabilities, but 
carriers similar to Liaoning, let alone larger and more capable ships, should not be 
considered low-intensity. In addition to the combat power that carriers can bring to bear, 
considerable time and resources are required to construct, operate, and maintain a carrier 
force, especially one being developed from the ground-up by a nation without a history or 
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culture of carrier aviation to rely on. What low-intensity functions would a carrier force 
serve that could not be served by more appropriately scaled and cost effective forces? 
Erickson, Denmark, and Collins offer six potential roles for PLAN carriers, but 
four of them do not provide significant strategic relevance. First, carriers could be 
employed to ensure the security of China’s SLOCs against low-intensity threats such as 
piracy. Chinese leaders have recognized the threat posed by piracy to the sea lanes that 
transport the majority of imported Chinese oil, leading to PLAN anti-piracy deployments 
in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. Despite the success of these patrols, Erickson, Denmark, 
and Collins argue that counter-piracy  
could be enhanced significantly by carrier-based, dedicated, airborne 
reconnaissance platforms. Carrier-borne strike-fighters would also give 
China a credible way to deter and attack pirates, as well as any other 
elements that attempted to disrupt Chinese vessels in the South China Sea, 
the Indian Ocean, or beyond.53  
Airborne reconnaissance would aid the counter-piracy mission, but carrier-based, 
fixed-wing reconnaissance is not the most effective way to extend influence over a 
SLOC. Negotiating basing agreements for long-range, high-endurance maritime patrol 
aircraft would offer larger sensor suites, longer loiter times, and extended ranges for 
potentially lower cost. A complementary or alternate option is the use of rotary-wing 
assets that can be integrated with the smaller surface combatants. Even a large-deck 
amphibious ship that could accommodate several helicopters, small boats, special 
operations forces, and a contingent of marines would be better suited for handling 
irregular threats at sea than the more specialized capabilities of carrier-based strike-
fighters. 
Second, PLAN carriers could be used for humanitarian relief missions. Erickson, 
Denmark, and Collins state that “the PLAN could reap substantial diplomatic benefits 
from a carrier that could support intensive helicopter operations following a disaster like 
the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami or Japan’s 2011 earthquake.”54 It is true that China 
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provided only a meager contribution to the multi-national relief efforts in the wake of the 
2004 tsunami while the United States dispatched the Abraham Lincoln CSG, the 
Bonhomme Richard expeditionary strike group (ESG), and the hospital ship Mercy. 
China appeared helpless in the face of death and destruction on the doorstep of the South 
China Sea. Former U.S. Undersecretary of the Navy Bob Work said, “The tsunami 
embarrassed them. The Chinese respond to embarrassments in very focused ways.”55 If 
the PLAN was truly concerned with responding to humanitarian crises, however, they 
would be better served by large-deck amphibious ships carrying heavy lift helicopters, 
landing craft, and marines to provide manpower ashore. Similar to the argument against 
using fixed-wing carriers against low-intensity threats along vital SLOCs, improved 
amphibious capability or investment in humanitarian ships similar to Mercy would be a 
more cost effective way to exercise soft-power. The U.S. Navy dispatched Abraham 
Lincoln to the scene because she was already nearby on a port call to Hong Kong. The 
carrier provided some relief through a handful of embarked helicopters, but she was not 
ideally suited for the task. Although Chinese analysts noted the use of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower as a platform for U.S. Army helicopters during the 1994 peacekeeping 
mission in Haiti, their interest only proves that what is needed for humanitarian missions 
is a flat surface at sea that can support large numbers of helicopters.56 A carrier like 
Liaoning with a ski jump for launching fixed-wing fighters is not the answer. In addition, 
humanitarian relief beyond the mainland still appears to be low on China’s list of 
priorities. After Typhoon Haiyan swept across the Philippines in November 2013, the 
Chinese government under-utilized its most capable soft-power instrument—financial 
aid—by pledging only $100,000. Within days, domestic and international criticism 
prompted the government to supplement its pledge with $1.4 million in supplies.57 
Third, PLAN carriers could be used for extended-range power projection along 
vital SLOCs between China and the markets and resources of Europe, Africa, and the 
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Middle East. While contending that access to the global economic system is a vital 
Chinese national interest, Erickson, Denmark, and Collins acknowledge that the support 
system needed to sustain extended deployments of PLAN carriers would require a 
reversal of historical Chinese distaste for basing agreements with foreign governments. 
Although a textbook used by China’s National Defense University promotes the 
establishment of “a contemporary, integrated and offensive, new, special mixed fleet with 
an aircraft carrier as core and missile destroyers (or cruisers) and nuclear attack 
submarines as backbone forces” to secure China’s vital SLOCs, it is unclear what threats 
would prompt Chinese officials to adopt such a force structure.58 The description sounds 
suspiciously like a U.S. Navy CSG, which is counter to General Qian’s assertion that 
China’s carriers are intended for offshore defense instead of regional or global reach. In 
addition, the sea-borne economic system that China is so reliant on is also in the national 
interests of states around the globe. The 2011 national military strategy of the United 
States reaffirms the historical U.S. commitment to international freedom of action and 
access to the global commons while condemning both state and non-state actors seeking 
to limit access. The mission described by China’s National Defense University is the 
mission of the U.S. Navy in cooperation with regional navies around the world. If China 
desires to assume some of the responsibility for ensuring freedom of access—although 
contrary to China’s established practices of developing anti-access capabilities and 
aggressively pursuing excessive maritime territorial claims—traditional surface 
combatants and maritime patrol aircraft are a more appropriate contribution. The 
construction of U.S.-style CSGs is both costly and unnecessary.  
Fourth, carriers could be used in a Taiwan scenario. Although carriers were 
promoted by Admiral Liu as an alternative to constructing additional mainland airfields 
adjacent to Taiwan; Erickson, Denmark, and Collins acknowledge that Chinese land-
based aircraft are now fully capable of handling a Taiwan scenario while PLA A2/AD 
capabilities prevent foreign naval intervention. Instead, they suggest that a PLAN carrier 
could be used to protect the approaches to the scene of action along the periphery, such as 
south of Hainan Island. However, this role assumes that there is a need to protect the 
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approaches from something. Foreign naval forces, especially U.S. Navy CSGs, would be 
more vulnerable along the north and south approaches than they would be approaching 
Taiwan from the east. PLA A2/AD weapons, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic 
missile, can cover the peripheral approaches in addition to the sea around Taiwan, and the 
northern and southern routes are exposed to additional threats from land-based aircraft, 
cruise missiles, and surveillance assets. The authors concede that a carrier similar to 
Liaoning would need to be “backed up by land-based air cover” to succeed in such guard 
duty.59 The reasons for this limitation will be discussed in a later section. 
D. RETURNING TO A CARRIER’S ROOTS: POWER PROJECTION 
Erickson, Denmark, and Collins’s remaining two roles for PLAN carriers are 
much closer to meeting Chinese strategic intent and return to the core mission of a carrier 
force: power projection. First, the authors argue that Admiral Liu “envisioned the 
maintenance of China’s claims in the South China Sea as a primary carrier mission . . . 
[and] worried that amphibious vessels did not provide adequate air cover.”60 Indeed, in 
2010, retired PLA General Xu Guangyu told a reporter, “Our carrier will definitely not 
engage with the U.S.’ powerful aircraft carrier fighting groups, but it’s enough to be a 
symbolic threat among neighboring countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines who have territorial disputes with China.”61 The ability to extend offensive 
air power beyond the current reach of land-based aircraft gives the symbolic threat real 
credibility. From China’s southernmost airfields on Hainan Island, the PLA’s Su-30 
family of frontline strike-fighters can barely cover the Spratly Islands without in-flight 
refueling, and Indonesia and most of the Philippines southeast of Manila remain beyond 
their reach.62 In addition, the Su-30 family is incompatible with the refueling system on 
China’s aging fleet of approximately three PLANAF and ten PLAAF H-6U tankers.63 
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Carriers would provide China with greater flexibility, increased on-station time, and more 
responsive aerial forces to project power over disputed maritime territories in the South 
China Sea or over the Philippine and Indonesian archipelagoes; carrier air forces could 
support an amphibious assault, defend occupied islands from counter-attack, and deter or 
defeat a response from regional neighbors.  
Second, carriers could help the PLAN project power beyond the First Island 
Chain but not in the way that Erickson, Denmark, and Collins envision. They assert:  
aircraft carriers could ultimately help the PLAN begin to shift its 
operational focus within the First and Second Island Chains from anti 
access and area denial to sea control. . . . [which] seeks to assert a navy’s 
mastery over a given body of water in relative perpetuity.64  
Their statement implies that A2/AD and offensive sea control are mutually exclusive, and 
the PLAN must consciously shift from one to the other. Fortunately for the PLAN, 
however, the two concepts are mutually supportive. It is true that PLA A2/AD 
capabilities present a formidable challenge to any outside navy that might attempt to 
intervene in a maritime territorial dispute, but the A2/AD umbrella may not serve only a 
defensive purpose. In 2009, Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhang observed, “In order to 
defend the security of the national territory, marine territories and the waters within the 
First Island Chain, this proactive defense strategy does not mean that our navy only stays 
within the First Island Chain.”65  
What would a proactive defense strategy look like? Daniel Kostecka, a senior 
U.S. Navy analyst, ties PLA counter-strike doctrine, designed to disrupt an opponent’s 
rear areas through long-range strike to prevent or delay intervention in a regional conflict, 
with U.S. vulnerabilities in logistics and command-and-control. Citing a 2005 PLAN 
People’s Navy newspaper article that identified continuous underway replenishment as a 
major weakness of U.S. Navy CSGs, Kostecka argues that logistics and command-and-
control assets are likely first targets at the opening of a Western Pacific conflict between 
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China and the United States. Deprived of underway replenishment, aerial refueling, and 
land-based AEW, the U.S. Navy and Air Force would be forced to withdraw or accept 
operations under degraded conditions far from logistical support. If U.S. naval forces did 
attempt to join the battle, the PLA’s 2004 “Study on Joint Firepower Warfare Theory” 
suggests that land-based ballistic missile forces and the PLAN will coordinate anti-ship 
missile attacks from both high and low altitudes as far out to sea as possible. In such a 
scenario, carrier-based air cover would be essential for PLAN forces operating beyond 
the reach of land-based aircraft in addition to serving as low-altitude, anti-ship cruise 
missile platforms.66 
Zhang’s statement and Kostecka’s prediction fit neatly with Toshi Yoshihara and 
James Holmes’s suggestion of a Maoist influence on PLAN strategy: a type of guerilla 
warfare at sea.67 For Mao Tse-tung, they argue, “[resorting] to the strategic defensive did 
not limit military strategy or tactics to the purely defensive or passive.”68 In a maritime 
conflict, China could undertake tactical offensives as part of a larger strategic defense to 
prevent or delay outside intervention. The PLAN could use the maneuvering space inside 
the First Island Chain, the use of which has been denied to an opponent by A2/AD 
weapons, as an interior line from which to project power out to the Second Island Chain 
or beyond. Similar to the widely accepted doctrinal concept of air superiority, sea control 
could be projected beyond the First Island Chain over a specified area for an objective-
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driven period of time instead of in perpetuity. Toward this end, PLAN carrier aircraft 
would serve either as strike platforms employing anti-ship cruise missiles or, as 
suggested by Erickson, Denmark, and Collins, provide air superiority over a PLAN 
surface action group.69  
E. INDICATORS OF STRATEGIC PURPOSE 
Carriers are ideally suited for projecting power over disputed maritime territories 
or beyond the First Island Chain as part of a proactive defense.70 Strategic decisions 
concerning the PLAN’s force structure will determine which of the two roles their future 
carrier force is weighted towards, but it is too early to make a determination based on 
Liaoning, which will likely be used as a training carrier.71 The PLAN faces the daunting 
task of developing a carrier culture from scratch. In addition to training aviators in carrier 
takeoff and landing, shipboard sensors and command-and-control systems need to be 
integrated with the airwing, sailors must learn how to manage the movement of aircraft 
on the flight deck, maintenance personnel will have to overcome unique aircraft 
maintenance problems in the corrosive environment, support and escort vessels must be 
integrated into a battle group, and senior officers must learn how to effectively employ 
the ship and airwing. Significant growing pains are unavoidable, but lessons from 
Liaoning’s experience will pay enormous dividends for future Chinese carrier design and 
doctrine. Seven months after Liaoning’s 2012 commissioning, the ship’s crew amassed 
more than 4,000 recommendations for improvement.72 Many changes will be minor, but 
observers are on the lookout for changes in future carrier designs that carry significant 
strategic consequences. 
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The continued use of a flight deck ski jump on future carrier classes will be the 
most significant indicator because it affects the composition and capabilities of future 
airwings. Lacking a catapult assisted takeoff capability, the ski jump design limits the 
weight of launching aircraft and, therefore, the weight of the ordnance that the aircraft 
can carry. Since the PLAN has focused on development of the J-15, an unlicensed copy 
of Russia’s Su-33 strike-fighter, as the backbone of future carrier airwings, continued 
reliance on ski jump designs will necessitate lighter configurations, indicating intent to 
use the carriers in an air-superiority role. The J-15 would be able to provide some 
capability in an air-to-surface strike role, but the aircraft’s full strike potential will not be 
realized unless mated with a catapult assisted carrier.73  
In addition, a catapult design is considered necessary to support larger, heavier 
aircraft that serve AEW and logistics roles, which is why Erickson, Denmark, and Collins 
assert that a ski jump carrier would need to be supported by land-based aircraft to guard 
the seaward approaches to Taiwan. Without the benefit of organic, long-endurance AEW 
aircraft such as the U.S. Navy’s E-2C Hawkeye, PLAN vessels are reliant on surface 
based radars with horizon limitations determined by their height above the sea, providing 
detection sanctuaries to distant opponents and shortening the time available for radar 
controllers to direct fighters toward an intercept. In a defensive role, PLAN carriers 
would be at a severe disadvantage operating beyond land-based AEW coverage—
something they will need to do if they are going to operate beyond the First Island Chain 
as part of a proactive defense. Disagreeing with the PLAN’s decision to purchase an ex-
Soviet design specifically because of its inability to support AEW aircraft, Rear Admiral 
Yin Zhuo called the ski jump a “mistake.”74  
If the PLAN retains the ski jump design but breaks with its current fighter-centric 
airwing concept to acquire alternative aircraft optimized for light attack, the strike role 
will become more prominent. The Harrier family of short takeoff aircraft has served 
successfully onboard the U.S. Navy’s Tarawa and Wasp-class amphibious assault ships, 
Britain’s Hermes and Invincible, and Spain’s Príncipe de Asturias. However, the Royal 
                                                 
73 Erickson, Denmark, and Collins, “Beijing’s Starter Carrier,” 30. 
74 Ibid., 33. 
 28 
Navy’s experience in the 1982 Falklands conflict serves as a warning to any navy 
considering reliance on short range, light attack aircraft without the support of air-
superiority fighters and AEW aircraft in the face of even a moderately capable opponent.  
F. CONCLUSION 
In 1971, a Chinese official said, “China will never build an aircraft carrier. 
Aircraft carriers are tools of imperialism; they’re like sitting ducks waiting to be shot.”75 
It is now obvious that the PLAN has shed its inhibitions. China’s nascent carrier force is 
undergoing a period of self-discovery, and, while the country’s defense goals and global 
economic awareness have blossomed in recent years, the rapidly modernizing PLAN is 
enduring growing pains to meet the needs of the nation. New tactics, systems, and 
operational concepts will be tested, and many will be discarded along the way as the 
PLAN masters new roles in Chinese defense strategy. In the meantime, there is nearly as 
much disagreement among Chinese analysts as among their western counterparts over the 
exact nature of China’s carrier ambitions. While it is true that China’s continued 
economic growth and national interests lie increasingly on the sea, there is little reason to 
project power beyond the Western Pacific into arenas that remain the traditional haunts of 
the U.S. Navy and its regional partners. Economic and territorial interests much closer to 
home, however, continue to figure prominently in China’s defense white papers and in its 
interactions with neighboring states. The PLAN’s future carrier force, while providing 
inherent flexibility for contingencies in distant seas, is likely destined for power 
projection roles that will allow China to assert military influence within its regional 
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III. THE INDIAN NAVY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, Arun Prakash, an Indian naval aviator, future commanding officer of the 
aircraft carrier Viraat, and eventual Chief of the Naval Staff, remarked on reactions to 
India’s naval modernization of the late 1980s: 
India has possessed a million-strong army and a thousand-aircraft air force 
(respectively, the third and fourth largest in the world) for many years 
without attracting inordinate attention. Current efforts to bring her navy to 
an equal strength level are raising hackles in some quarters. This, perhaps, 
significantly indicates the implications of naval power. In this context, the 
question most often asked is: What is India’s purpose in having two 
aircraft carriers and plans to build a third?76 
His statement sums up India’s strategic quandary. Years of border wars between India 
and its northern neighbors—Pakistan and China—have solidified the army and air force’s 
position in the national defense paradigm while saddling the Indian Navy (IN) with what 
Prakash describes as a “Cinderella service” burden.77 This burden, however, is contrary 
to what many might regard as India’s natural strategic position, both in terms of 
geography and its growing, internationally-oriented economy. “An array of land-driven 
concerns has . . . since Independence, had a way of dragging India back to shore. . . . 
Blessed by its geography, India is cursed by its neighborhood,” laments Iskander 
Rehman.78 Despite the neighborhood, however, the IN has endured. Now, after 
publishing a new maritime strategy in 2007, the IN is aggressively pursuing naval 
modernization programs that include foreign and indigenously produced carriers. Unlike 
the PLAN, however, IN carrier acquisitions are not a revolutionary break from the past. 
Instead, the acquisition of Vikrant—the second IN carrier to bear that name—and 
Vikramaditya is the realization of a long-standing dream for the IN and its aspirations to 
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be a blue-water navy without equal in the Indian Ocean. This chapter examines the IN’s 
historical approach to naval power projection, its historical relationship with aircraft 
carriers, and the role of carriers in contemporary Indian maritime strategy. 
B. INDIA’S HISTORICAL APPROACH TO NAVAL AND CARRIER-BASED 
POWER PROJECTION 
The IN inherited a healthy respect for carriers from the Royal Navy. Based on a 
1947 strategic assessment of India’s security needs after independence from the British 
Empire, the IN envisioned two fleets, each anchored by a carrier, that could cover the east 
and west coasts of India, which Cheng Ruisheng describes as a “big dagger penetrating 
the heart of the Indian Ocean.”79 In 1957, India purchased the World War II surplus 
carrier Hercules from Britain: refitted with an angled flight deck and steam catapults, the 
ship was reborn in 1961 as the original Vikrant. India’s first carrier, however, was forced 
to wait for the right moment to make an impression. In 1962, the Sino-Indian war erupted 
with PLA offensives across the disputed Himalayan border and cemented what Prakash 
describes as the “continental bias of Indian thinkers.”80 During the Indo-Pakistani War of 
1965, Pakistani and Indian naval forces each played minor roles while the bulk of 
operations were conducted in or near the disputed Kashmir region. Vikrant was in dry-
dock at the time, a fact recounted with a sense of regret by the Indian Ministry of 
Defense’s bimonthly magazine Sainik Samachar, in a brief history of the ship.81  
Finally, in 1971, Vikrant, along with the rest of the IN’s power projection 
capabilities, was put to the test in the first of two episodes identified by Prakash as 
“demonstrations of the classical application of naval power:” episodes that helped 
undermine the previous continental bias of Indian strategic thought.82 From December 4–
10 during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, Vikrant launched highly successful air strikes 
against Pakistani shipping in the ports of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar in East Pakistan—
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present day Bangladesh. Vikrant’s strikes, as part of a larger IN blockade of the Bay of 
Bengal, helped isolated East Pakistan from the larger war: the damage done to shipping 
and port facilities is generally credited with neutralizing East Pakistani ports, preventing 
the sustainment of East Pakistani forces, and isolating the eastern theater from the larger 
war.83 Simultaneously, IN surface forces in the west conducted surface-to-surface missile 
strikes against Karachi, destroying Pakistani warships, merchantmen, and fuel reserves. 
Taken together, the IN’s highly successful strike operations in two theaters proved the 
utility of naval power projection launched from the Indian Ocean.  
Vikrant, however, was not the only carrier to make an impression on the Indians 
in 1971. Prakash observes  
the significance of naval power was rudely brought home to Indian 
strategists and politicians when President Nixon attempted to intervene in 
the war on behalf of Pakistan by dispatching Task Force 74 to the Bay of 
Bengal. . . . Nixon’s deployment of the Enterprise task force was a 
somewhat ill-considered and ill-timed attempt at gunboat diplomacy. . . . It 
helped, more than anything else, to solidify a consensus—both politically 
and militarily—that there was a need to insulate the country against 
externally applied pressures and laid a firm foundation for India’s naval 
resurgence.84  
The war concluded before the Enterprise task force arrived, but the point was made. The 
1971 war, therefore, served two important functions in the evolution of Indian naval 
strategic thought. First, it demonstrated the strategic potential of robust, sea-based power 
projection and strike warfare on the Indian sub-continent. Second, it demonstrated the 
coercive power that naval power grants to the state that wields it. The Enterprise episode 
argued in favor of a more powerful IN by exposing India’s vulnerability to third party 
pressure while underscoring, on a grander scale, the strategic lesson of power projection 
provided by Vikrant. Given the lessons of 1971, it is not surprising that the IN purchased 
the Royal Navy’s Hermes—the V/STOL carrier of Falklands fame—in 1987 and 
renamed her Viraat, making the IN the first multi-carrier navy to call Asia home since 
1945. 
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C. INDIAN STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION 
In 1990, Prakash dubbed the IN “a blue water force [with] the capability to deploy 
anywhere in the Indian Ocean as an instrument of national policy.”85 The continental bias 
of the 1950s and ‘60s that he previously described seems in retrospect to be a momentary 
lapse in strategic judgment by Indian policy makers who were subsequently brought to 
their senses and have since given the sea the attention that it deserves, marking a 
significant difference from their Chinese counterparts. Unlike China, modern India has 
always been conscious of the sea both because of its geographic position as Ruisheng’s 
dagger and because of the role that the sea has played in the state’s political history. 
“That their country had been prey to centuries of invasions and conquests,” remarks 
Prakash,  
and that the final domination by an alien power resulted not from overland 
invasion, but by invasion across her shores, is a racial memory embedded 
in the Indian psyche. The thought process of common men and 
intellectuals alike have been conditioned with a deep-rooted fear that the 
country faces an ever-present threat of losing its independence—whether 
the menace be military, economic, or political.86  
If Prakash is correct, it is easier to understand India’s motivation for pursuing a navy that 
can guarantee its position and embracing concepts of naval power that it inherited from 
the British Empire and continues to observe from the United States. 
The Western—particularly U.S.—influences in Indian naval strategy are 
undeniable. Richard Bitzinger argues that the IN strives to be the sea control force of the 
Indian Ocean in the same way that the U.S. Navy exercises sea control globally, and is 
focused on carriers as the engine to achieve that goal.87 Geoffrey Till adds that the IN’s 
force structure, much like the U.S. Navy’s, is designed to confront a variety of potential 
threats: a broad requirement that makes carriers valuable assets around which to base 
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operations.88 The strongest marks of U.S. influence, however, are found in Freedom to 
Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy. First, in the strategy’s foreword, Chief 
of the Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta states, “the focus would be on critical 
capabilities [rather] than on the number of ships or aircraft,” which is the same way that 
the U.S. Navy has strived to maintain qualitative advantages over potential adversaries.89 
Second, access and shaping, two terms firmly rooted in the lexicon of U.S. military and 
maritime strategy, are woven together in the Indian strategy:  
Nine important passages provide access into the Indian Ocean, of which 
five are key energy Seas Lines of Communications (SLOC). . . . Choking 
any one of them would cause disruption of seaborne trade, and 
uncontrolled volatility in oil and commodity prices, leading to upheavals 
in the global economy.90  
Not only is access to the Indian Ocean recognized as controllable, the document 
considers the security of Indian Ocean SLOCs in global terms. To ensure access, shaping 
in the “areas which control access to the Indian Ocean” is necessary to prepare the 
maritime battle-space.91 Third, forward presence is promoted as a way to enable 
“political and military decision-makers to be proactive rather than reactive in dealing 
with situations.”92 Finally, the strategy unabashedly states that “freedom to use the seas 
will become crucial if India is to attain her ‘manifest destiny:’” a term rarely used outside 
of nineteenth century U.S. history.93 All of these concepts, with the exception of manifest 
destiny, are found in the U.S. sea services’ A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower, although the Indian document was published five months before its U.S. 
counterpart. Notably, India’s Freedom to Use the Seas cites U.S. sources titled The 
Maritime Strategy, From the Sea, and Forward from the Sea in a pseudo bibliography.94 
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What, however, does the strategy indicate about India’s perceptions of sea-based 
power projection—particularly carriers and naval aviation—in the twenty-first century? 
While acknowledging the central role of light carriers in India’s first independent naval 
plans, which even in 1948 recognized the need to secure Indian Ocean SLOCs, the 2007 
strategy gives considerable attention to expeditionary and sea-to-shore strike warfare.95 
Influencing Operations Ashore and the Role of Air Power are listed among the “key 
determinants for shaping the maritime military strategy.”96 Again strikingly similar to 
U.S. strategic documents, the Indian strategy establishes the ability to influence events on 
land as a primary role for Indian maritime forces and charges maritime air power with 
achieving “synergistic effects” that include long-range, precision strike and 
surveillance.97 Lessons from the 1971 war are included in the strategy. First, “the 
identification of neutrals turned out to be much simpler than anticipated” despite 
concerns that strikes against Pakistani shipping in the western theater could inadvertently 
hit neutral merchants.98 Second, IN strategists lament that an effective, war-shortening 
amphibious assault was not conducted in 1971 and argue that “amphibious operations 
merit attention as such capabilities enhance options and opportunities that exist” in the 
region.99 The strategy also applies the IN’s historical record in low-intensity conflict. 
Recognizing the navy as the supporting service for army operations in Sri Lanka against 
the Tamil Tigers, the document admits that the IN “lacked capabilities to provide direct 
fire in support of Army operations” while stating that those deficiencies are now being 
addressed.100 Taken together with Indian recognition of SLOC security, freedom of 
access, and forward presence, the strategy’s statements concerning naval power 
projection indicate that the IN is striving to become a multi-role force in the mold of the 
U.S. Navy: capable of sustained expeditionary and strike operations to strategically 
influence regional events in addition to maintaining the security of the Indian Ocean.  
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D. ROLES FOR INDIAN CARRIERS 
In contrast to the opacity of Chinese intentions, the transparency of Freedom to 
Use the Seas assists analysis of roles for IN carriers. Indian references to the success of 
naval strike warfare in 1971 and deficiencies in joint fire support in Sri Lanka indicate 
both functions will be included in the carriers’ list of tasks. “Priority” is assigned to the 
development of long-range, precision strike systems to support expeditionary operations, 
and the document also addresses carrier use in counter-air operations through the 
introduction of “modern carrier-based aircraft and airborne surveillance systems.”101 
Sustainment of prolonged operations is also addressed through the “induction of tankers 
and afloat support ships with enhanced capability to replenish fuel, ammunition and 
victuals, and provide on-site maintenance support in distant areas for ships and 
submarines” and support facilities “in the farthest littoral reaches of the IOR.”102 
Considering these requirements together, a picture quickly emerges of IN task forces 
designed to conduct strike, expeditionary, and counter-air warfare for sustained periods 
far from the Indian coast. 
India possesses three carriers in varying states of readiness. With Vikrant’s (R11) 
decommissioning in 1997, Viraat served as the IN’s sole carrier until Vikramaditya—
formerly the Soviet Kiev-class Admiral Gorshkov—was commissioned in November 
2013, and the second Vikrant was launched in August 2013 under the IN’s Indigenous 
Aircraft Carrier (IAC) program but is not yet commissioned. The design and capabilities 
of the ships and their air wings speak directly to their roles in Indian naval strategy. As it 
did under the Royal Navy, Viraat continues to operate Sea Harriers from a ski-jump 
flight deck, and, before its retirement, Vikrant (R11) was converted from a catapult-
assisted-take-off-but-arrested-recovery (CATOBAR) carrier to a ski-jump design in 1983 
as its aging complement of conventional takeoff aircraft reached the end of their service 
lives. Reliance on V/STOL aircraft carries the same liabilities discussed in analysis of 
PLAN options, namely short ranges and smaller payloads. Prakash indicates, however, 
that the IN’s decision during the 1980s to operate V/STOL carriers was based more on a 
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lack of suitable conventional aircraft designs for light carriers than on any perceived 
advantage of the Harriers:  
Criticism of the IN’s decision to maintain an air capability at sea through 
the medium of V/STOL carriers, in spite of their limitations, has an 
element of validity. However, this was the result of a technology-gap, 
which failed to produce more capable aircraft for small carriers. 
Technology is not static, and it is vital that the IN keep the art of carrier 
aviation alive through the means of V/STOL machines, if necessary, till 
other options become available.103  
The art of carrier aviation that Prakash refers to is the carrier culture that the PLAN 
currently lacks, and it is alive in the IN today thanks to the transitory use V/STOL 
carriers. It is clear, however, that India does not intend to remain constrained by V/STOL 
limitations. 
Both Vikramaditya and Vikrant are short-take-off-but-arrested-recovery 
(STOBAR) carriers like China’s Liaoning. Writing in 1990, Prakash commented on 
Soviet experimentation with STOBAR designs and carrier variants of MiG-29 and Su-27 
fighters but concluded that the fuel and payload limitations imposed on the conventional 
aircraft by the rolling ski-jump takeoff should remove STOBAR designs from 
consideration by the IN.104 Press releases published on the IN’s website, however, state 
that Vikramaditya’s fixed-wing compliment will consist of MiG-29Ks and remaining Sea 
Harriers while Vikrant will carry MiG-29Ks and an indigenously produced Light Combat 
Aircraft (LCA) that has been under development since the 1980s.105 Despite the 
limitations of STOBAR designs, there are no illusions about the ships’ primary purpose: 
one press release states that “an aircraft carrier carrying long range multi-role fighters is a 
platform inherently designed for power projection. . . . The MiG-29K swing role fighter 
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is the main offensive platform and provides a quantum jump for the Indian Navy’s 
maritime strike capability.”106  
Similar to the PLAN’s Liaoning, all of the IN’s carriers are constrained by the 
lack of carrier-based fixed-wing AEW aircraft. Noting the AEW problem for smaller 
carriers, Prakash advocated for integrating Indian carriers with land-based aircraft. Even 
with long-range aircraft, however, that solution would tether IN carrier groups to the 
mainland, which is contrary to the vision of far-ranging power depicted in Freedom to 
Use the Seas.107 IN press releases do not mention early warning capabilities other than 
Vikrant’s surface-based sensor suite and Ka-31 helicopters, but do state that “the ship’s 
integration with [the] Navy’s Network Centric Operations will provide force 
multiplication.”108 If the IN can share data from a network of sensors, it may be able to 
compensate for a lack of high-altitude, organic AEW capabilities to permit extended-
range combat operations in the IOR. 
In an article for Journal of Defense Studies, Gurpreet Khurana proposes 
“numerous possible scenarios wherein [an Indian] carrier capability would be 
indispensable.”109 Similar to the list for Liaoning offered by Erickson, Denmark, and 
Collins, Khurana runs the gambit by including strike warfare, SLOC security, naval 
diplomacy, overseas interests and island territory security, and non-combat roles such as 
HADR. Just as in Liaoning’s case, all are inherent capabilities for carriers, but—given the 
evidence of Indian strategic intentions—some are more likely to figure into the IN’s 
strategic planning than others. Strike warfare grounded heavily in the experience of the 
1971 war figures prominently into India’s naval strategy, and it is reasonable to perceive 
a continuing need for sea-based strike as long as the rivalry with Pakistan continues and 
China becomes increasingly involved in the IOR. In addition, Vikramaditya has already 
conducted its first naval diplomacy mission: in January 2014, within days of China’s 
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publication of photos documenting the Liaoning task force’s first underway period, 
Vikramaditya joined Viraat for a multi-carrier photo opportunity and reminded the world 
that India is the only Asian state to operate more than one fixed-wing carrier since 
1945.110     
India’s professed consciousness of SLOC security begs the same question posed 
of China’s supposed need to secure its sea lanes: who poses a threat to India’s SLOCs? 
Just as the success of naval strike warfare in both theaters of the 1971 war left a lasting 
impression on Indian naval strategists, it is also likely that the IN’s only combat loss of a 
warship left a similar impression. On December 9, 1971, a Pakistani submarine sank the 
frigate Khukri, marking the IN’s most significant casualty in an otherwise highly 
successful campaign. India is, therefore, the first state to lose a ship to submarine warfare 
since the Second World War in addition to being the only Asian state with combat carrier 
experience since Imperial Japan. In addition, as the PLAN sends vessels to the Gulf of 
Aden to protect Chinese shipping from pirates, Indian strategists must wonder if the 
PLAN will eventually patrol the sea lanes near the Indian dagger. Just as in the PLAN’s 
case, however, SLOCs provide a useful concept to frame the argument in favor of a 
robust IN. Carriers are not required to provide SLOC security: they are power projection 
instruments as noted by several of the sources discussed.  
The utility of Indian landward power projection is well established, but the role of 
carriers in resting sea-control from an enemy during a future conflict offers potential 
pitfalls that Indian strategists should be wary of. Khurana, a commander in the IN and a 
research fellow at the Institute for Defense and Strategic Analysis, argues  
the raison d’etre of a carrier is to establish sea-control (including air-
dominance) in a sizeable area around it . . . This implies that before a 
carrier is put to sea, it must be capable of sanitizing all possible threats (in 
all dimensions) in the sea-control area.111  
In addition, addressing the threat posed by hostile anti-ship missiles, he states  
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the value of ‘organic’ aviation of a carrier here lies in the availability, at 
virtually immediate notice, of a means to search and positively identify 
distant hostile platforms, and thereafter ‘kill’ these, before a missile 
launch. This makes the carrier-borne aircraft in anti-air, anti-ship and anti-
submarine roles imperative, to protect not only the carrier and its escorts, 
but also other units operating in the area.112  
Khurana’s assertions propose one beguiling idea while exposing a quandary. First, the 
carrier can be misconceived as a silver bullet: an indispensable asset that can locate and 
destroy any hostile target on, over, or under the sea. American admirals can only dream 
of such capabilities, and are often professionally embarrassed by the discovery of a 
submarine in the wake of their flagships or the chance discovery of a foreign destroyer or 
maritime patrol aircraft hidden nearby among civilian traffic. Second, is the carrier and 
its task force a vital national asset whose protection becomes the mission of the air wing, 
or is the carrier’s purpose to employ the air wing against the enemy to achieve a strategic 
effect even at the risk of the carrier’s survival? On this question, Prakash is clear:  
One must start with the premise that the only certainty in a naval battle is 
that ships will be lost to enemy action. Admittedly, a carrier is a high-
visibility target of considerable value, but to demand invulnerability of 
any weapon system is to condemn it to oblivion.113  
Despite Khurana’s argument, the identity of aircraft carriers as power projection 
platforms and combat assets appears firmly grounded in Indian naval thought, and—
based on Prakash’s 1990 argument and statements concerning strike and expeditionary 
warfare in Freedom to Use the Seas—it is unlikely that IN strategists harbor 
misconceptions about a carrier’s strategic purpose.    
E. CONCLUSION 
Are India’s carrier programs and maritime strategy for the new century a response 
to a larger Asian naval buildup? Indian strategists are optimistic about improving 
relations with China: “Through a range of dialogue mechanisms, India and China have 
been able to appreciate each other’s point of view and sustain the bilateral dialogue on 
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outstanding issues.”114 Their optimism, however, does not close the door on potential 
sources of future conflict. Freedom to Use the Seas, Chapter 3, “Indian Ocean Region 
and its Geopolitics,” demonstrates that Indian strategists have a thorough understanding 
of regional socio-economic issues and the potential influence of the IN in regional and 
global maritime security. The final paragraph of the chapter, however, concludes with a 
telling statement. After acknowledging the common strategic interests between India and 
most extra-regional navies that have increased their operations in the Indian Ocean as a 
result of Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom and calling for further regional 
engagement, the document singles out the PLAN for extra scrutiny:  
The Chinese Navy is set on a path to becoming a blue water force. It has 
an ambitious modernization program. Notable amongst those are [sic] the 
renewed interest in the aircraft carrier program, the nuclear submarines, 
and the ballistic/cruise missile projects along with the attempts to gain 
strategic toe-hold [sic] in the IOR.115 
The strategy does not elaborate further, but it is the only non-positive reference to a navy 
other than Pakistan’s.  
In addition to China, Pakistan’s influence on Indian naval strategy, of course, 
cannot be ignored. It is clear that India’s experiences in Indo-Pakistani conflicts have 
colored their perceptions of sea power, but Pakistan also contributes to India’s 
relationship with China. Till observes that “the naval situation between China and India is 
complicated by the parallel difficulties that India has with Pakistan,” and offers Indian 
Defense Minister A. K. Antony’s assessment that “the increasing nexus between China 
and Pakistan in the military sphere remains an area of serious concern. We have to carry 
out continuous appraisals of Chinese military capabilities and shape our responses 
accordingly.”116 Against either rival, carrier task forces modeled on U.S. CSG’s offer 
options to Indian policy makers while also serving India’s peacetime aspirations in the 
Indian Ocean.  
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The IN certainly considers itself to be the gatekeeper of the IOR, and its 2007 
maritime strategy recognizes the ability of the navy to influence the strategic environment 
on land. Until recently, however, the IN has not had to compete with the PLAN in the 
Indian Ocean. Now, given the PLAN’s modernization and forays to the Gulf of Aden and 
Southeast Asia, India must confront the reality that a traditionally continental rival is also 
a potential maritime rival. Indian acknowledgment of the PLANs carrier program, 
however, does not indicate that Indian carrier acquisitions are a direct response. Rather, 
based on Freedom to Use the Seas, carriers are part of a larger effort to develop the IN 
into a capable, multi-purpose force that is receiving increasing attention in part because 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 43 
IV. THE JAPANESE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early days of the Cold War, Japan has adhered to an “exclusively 
defense-oriented” national security policy, which the Japanese Ministry of Defense 
(MoD) states “means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the 
extent of use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and 
that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the 
minimum necessary for self-defense.”117 On March 18, 2009, however, the Japanese 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) commissioned its first new aircraft carrier since 
the Second World War, raising reasonable questions about the role of a power projection 
instrument in a defensive policy. The JMSDF’s two Hyuga and two Izumo-class 
helicopter destroyers (DDH) are much more than just replacements for the Haruna-class 
destroyers that retired in 2011. According to retired Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, “Hyuga 
realizes a long-standing dream and goal of the JMSDF, which has wanted to be a truly 
capable maritime force, with escort—that is, antisubmarine warfare (ASW)—carriers.”118  
Although not conceived or built as fixed-wing carriers, Japan’s new DDH 
generation requires careful consideration alongside other regional carrier programs for 
three reasons. First, the Hyuga and Izumo-classes are capable of supporting fixed-wing 
V/STOL aircraft, leading to speculation that Japan intends to embark F-35B Joint Strike 
Fighters on the ships.119 Second, although outwardly similar to large-deck amphibious 
assault ships such as the U.S. Navy’s Tarawa and Wasp-classes, Japan’s DDHs were not 
designed or conceived to be amphibious vessels: a distinction that draws attention to the 
JMSDF’s unique Cold War strategic heritage as an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) force. 
Finally and most importantly, the new DDHs are the first front-line Japanese warships to 
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feature a through-deck design since the aircraft carriers of Imperial Japan, representing a 
significant shift in Japanese public and political perceptions of the East Asian security 
environment and instruments of power projection. This chapter considers the implications 
of Japan’s new DDHs by examining the JMSDF’s Cold War doctrine, Japan’s post-Cold 
War security concerns, and new power projection requirements. 
B. JAPAN’S POST-SECOND WORLD WAR APPROACH TO NATIONAL 
DEFENSE AND NAVAL POWER 
The two strongest influences on Japanese defense policy following the Second 
World War have been the 1947 Constitution of Japan and the 1960 Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. Article IX of the 
Constitution famously states  
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the 
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international 
disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, 
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized.120  
The developing Cold War and U.S. strategic requirements to resist the expansion 
of Soviet influence overcame strict interpretation of Article IX. With the support of the 
United States, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) were founded in 1954 and 
Article IX was reinterpreted to permit Japan to exercise the right of self-defense. 
According to the MoD, 
Since Japan is an independent state, it is recognized beyond doubt that the 
provision in the article does not deny the inherent right of self-defense that 
Japan is entitled to maintain as a sovereign nation. Thus the self-defense 
right of Japan is not denied, and therefore, the Government of Japan 
interprets the Constitution as being allowed to possess and maintain the 
minimum level of armed strength for self-defense necessary to ensure that 
Japan exercises the right. On the basis of such understanding, the 
government has adopted an exclusively defense-oriented policy as it basic 
policy of national defense, has maintained the Self-Defense Forces as an 
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armed organization, and has taken steps to improve their capabilities and 
conduct their operations under the Constitution.121 
Despite the reinterpretation, the pacifism embodied in the peace constitution remains 
deeply entrenched in modern Japanese politics and culture. Japan adopted strict non-
nuclear weapon policies in 1968, self-imposed a ban on all arms exports in 1976, and 
renounced the right of collective self-defense granted to all states by the United Nations 
(U.N.) charter.122 In addition, the Congressional Research Service notes that the 
constitutional legality of maintaining the JSDF was a topic of debate in Japan as recently 
as 2013.123 
In 1957, the Japanese government adopted its Basic Policy on National Defense 
to guide the development of defense policy within the constraints of Article IX. In 
addition to confirming adherence to only defensive capabilities, the Basic Policy 
stipulated “dealing with external aggression based on the security arrangements with the 
U.S.” while working through the U.N. to address the source of aggression.124 This 
arrangement was written into Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security, which states 
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the 
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its 
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any 
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such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such 
measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the 
measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
security.125 
The constitution and the U.S.-Japan defense treaty created the context for the 
development of JSDF doctrine that continues to exist today. All JSDF capabilities are 
intended to deter aggression against Japan—and territories under Japanese 
administration—and defend Japan if deterrence fails. Offensive action outside of 
Japanese territory is the responsibility of the United States, which is relieved of many 
defensive responsibilities around Japanese territory by a “‘spear and shield’ 
relationship.”126  
The JMSDF draws its strategic purpose and doctrine of protecting the sea space 
and SLOCs around Japan from the U.S.-Japan defense relationship. As Koda describes,  
The JMSDF ensures that Japan can receive American reinforcements from 
across the Pacific Ocean, guarantees the safety of U.S. naval forces 
operating around Japan, and enables U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) to 
concentrate on strike operations against enemy naval forces and land 
targets. At the same time, for Japan, as a country with few natural 
resources and little domestic food production, the safety of merchant 
shipping is a matter of national survival in crisis and wartime.127 
Soviet submarines posed a significant threat to Japan’s national survival and the U.S. 
Navy’s freedom of action in East Asian waters during the Cold War, driving the JMSDF 
to become a semi-specialized ASW force. In addition to land-based maritime patrol 
aircraft and surface ships, JMSDF planners recognized the ASW potential of early naval 
helicopters and developed plans for ASW “hunter/killer” groups consisting of several 
destroyers centered on a helicopter carrier (CVH) that could range the SLOCs and secure 
critical sea spaces from enemy submarines.128  
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Despite the recognized utility of ASW helicopter flotillas for the JMSDF’s 
strategic mission, the quest for a light carrier would take over forty years to realize due to 
deeply entrenched aversion to a carrier’s offensive image. The JSDF included a CVH in 
its 1961 budget request, but later withdrew it due to political opposition related to the 
domestic political debate over the U.S.-Japan defense treaty. By the late 1960s, the 
JMSDF calculated that a task force of eight destroyers and six helicopters was optimal for 
the ASW mission, but “it was still too early to make a serious argument for a ship that 
looked something like an aircraft carrier, even if it was simply an ASW helicopter 
platform.”129 Instead, the JMSDF settled for two over-sized destroyers that could support 
three helicopters each: the original DDHs of the Haruna-class. The threat posed by 
Soviet air-launched anti-ship missiles (ASMs) in the late 1980s prompted the JMSDF to 
consider a fleet defense carrier employing fighters and airborne early-warning (AEW) 
aircraft to protect its ASW forces, but the idea was rejected “due to [the] negative 
resonance of the phrase ‘aircraft carrier.’”130 The JMSDF was forced to settle again, 
adopting the Aegis guided missile destroyer (DDG) because of its inoffensive image 
despite its inability to threaten Soviet aircraft attacking the fleet.131 The early 1990s 
witnessed the first through-deck design for the JMSDF but not on a carrier. Arguing for a 
new tank landing ship (LST) design on the grounds of safety and efficiency for helicopter 
lift operations, the JMSDF succeeded in securing the through-deck Oosumi-class. 
Perceptions still mattered, however, and the JMSDF was forced to designate Oosumi as a 
“maritime operational transport” that could not operate its helicopters in combat.132 It 
would take several more years and a new threat to finally convince the Japanese 
government of the need for a through-deck combat carrier.133 
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C. JAPAN’S SHIFTING SECURITY CONCERNS AND EVOLVING 
DEFENSE POLICY 
By 2001, designs were being produced for a new DDH to replace the aging 
Haruna-class. One design presented to the Japanese public was a destroyer-like vessel 
with two helicopter flight decks—one fore and one aft—completely separated by the 
ship’s superstructure. Koda argues that “this seems to have been done to offset potential 
public objections rooted in the offensive image of aircraft carriers.”134 The DDH design 
finally agreed upon, however, was the through-deck Hyuga: a seemingly small step for 
most modern navies, but a landmark event for Japan given its post-Second World War 
aversions.  
The evolving East Asian security environment is responsible for breaking down 
Japan’s mental barriers. With the release of National Defense Program Guidelines: FY 
2005- (NDPG 2005), Japanese planners acknowledged departures from the Cold War-era 
defense paradigm that shaped the twentieth century JSDF: the growing importance of 
terrorists and non-state actors, North Korean nuclear proliferation, and Chinese military 
expansion took more prominent roles in the list of national security threats. In a 
significant admission for a pacifist state, the guidelines state  
the use of military force now plays a broader role in the international 
community than simply deterring or responding to armed conflict. Military 
force is also used for a variety of purposes, including the prevention of 
conflict and the [sic] reconstruction assistance.135  
Breaking with traditional adherence to the Basic Policy on National Defense, Japan was 
signaling its willingness to collaborate in “international peace cooperation activities” with 
an improved JSDF “capable of effectively responding to new threats and diverse 
situations.”136  
NDPG 2005 was a transitional document, and the subtle language used to indicate 
small breaks from the Basic Policy suggests that Japanese policy makers were struggling 
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to address both new and traditional threats in an increasingly alien environment. The 
majority of the document emphasized benefits of the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japanese 
intentions to work through the U.N. and other international institutions to promote global 
peace and non-proliferation principles. North Korean ballistic missiles received more 
attention than any other regional threat including China: a country that NPDG 2005’s 
authors coolly shelved by saying, “We will have to remain attentive to its future 
actions.”137  
 The subsequent National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond 
(NDPG 2011), however, leave little doubt about China’s primacy in contemporary 
Japanese defense planning. First, NDPG 2011 notes “a growing number of so-called 
‘gray-zone’ disputes . . . over territory, sovereignty, and economic interests:” a clear 
reference to the sharp increase in confrontations with China over maritime territories.138 
Second, the document points to “a global shift in the balance of power” through the rise 
of states such as China and “the relative change of influence of the United States.”139 
Third, the document warns of “risks concerning sustained access to the seas, space, and 
cyberspace” and more frequent Chinese operations in seas near Japan: references to the 
threat posed by Chinese A2/AD capabilities.140  
NDPG 2011 called for several dramatic changes to address growing regional 
uncertainty, directing the JSDF to abandon the Basic Policy in favor of “a Dynamic 
Defense Force that possesses readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and 
versatility” to actively engage with “India and other countries that share common 
interests in ensuring the security of maritime navigation from Africa and the Middle East 
to East Asia;” and to acquire specific defense capabilities such as minesweepers “broad 
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scale” maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, and 
nation-wide ballistic missile defenses.141  
The recognition of the naval mine threat is particularly significant to the 
development of the Hyuga and Izumo-classes: the relevance of mine warfare and mine 
countermeasures was necessarily on the minds of JMSDF planners before the publication 
of NDPG 2011, and contributed to the argument in favor of a through-deck DDH. Koda 
notes the added requirement—identified in the design stage—for the new DDHs to 
accommodate MH-53E mine countermeasures helicopters, which are significantly larger 
than Japan’s SH-60 ASW helicopters and added weight to arguments in favor of a 
carrier-like design with additional hangar space below the flight deck.142 Throughout the 
Cold War, the Soviet naval threat was primarily embodied in submarines, but recognition 
of mine warfare as an element of Chinese A2/AD capabilities is now influencing JMSDF 
force structure.  
NDPG 2011 is also the first NDPG to mention the establishment of a readiness 
posture that would allow the JSDF to respond to acute threats, the improvement of 
defense infrastructure in Japan’s southwestern region, and the assignment of Japanese 
Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) priority to “the defense of off-shore islands.”143 It 
is little wonder why: statistics from the Japanese MoD show that the frequency of 
Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) fighter scrambles in response to incursions by 
Chinese aircraft began steadily increasing in 2008 and surpassed the number of scrambles 
in response to Russian aircraft in 2012.144 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MoFA) also charts the presence of Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone and 
territorial sea beginning with a 2008 confrontation between the Japanese Coast Guard and 
two Chinese government ships near the Senkaku Islands. The frequency of the Chinese 
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presence near the Senkakus began increasing in late 2010 before jumping sharply to 
unprecedented levels in 2012 and 2013.145  
D. POTENTIAL NAVAL SOLUTIONS TO NEW POWER PROJECTION 
REQUIREMENTS 
The latest edition of the Japanese MoD’s defense guidelines—National Defense 
Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond (NDPG 2014)—firmly establishes the 
continuity of the Chinese threat in Japan’s twenty-first century defense policy. Bluntly 
citing “cases where coastal states [have] unilaterally asserted their [perceived] rights . . . 
thereby unduly infringing the freedom of the high seas” and accusing China of 
“[attempting] to change the status quo by coercion” in ongoing island territorial disputes, 
NDPG 2014 concludes that Japan’s security predicament “has become increasingly 
severe” since the publication of NDPG 2011.146 Importantly, NDPG 2014 provides the 
JSDF with strong guidance for addressing current vulnerabilities. Remote or offshore 
islands are mentioned thirteen times in the thirty-one page English translation, and the 
JSDF is explicitly charged with developing amphibious plans and capabilities—which 
were previously avoided due to the offensive nature of amphibious forces—to 
“recapture” lost islands.147 In addition, NDPG 2014 builds on NPDG 2011’s Dynamic 
Defense Force concept with a new Dynamic Joint Defense Force to improve crisis 
response and directs the improvement of AEW capabilities to provide long-term 
command and control over southwestern Japan.148 The JGSDF is now training “marine 
infantry” in cooperation with U.S. advisors and is considering acquisition of amphibious 
assault vehicles and V-22 Osprey aircraft to facilitate movement and assault.149  
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Although designed primarily as ASW platforms, the new DDHs will have a role 
to play in future amphibious operations: the integration of the three JSDF branches into 
the joint force outlined in NDPG 2014 was being studied during Hyuga’s design phase. 
Consequently, accommodation for the embarkation of a joint staff headquarters was built 
in to the new DDH classes, and, although both the Hyuga and Izumo-classes lack well 
decks for landing craft, the larger Izumo has room for 970 while only requiring a crew of 
approximately 470.150 The remaining bunks could potentially accommodate a 500-strong 
JGSDF unit. Hyuga participated in the 2013 amphibious exercise Dawn Blitz alongside 
U.S. naval forces. Significantly, she employed CH-47 Chinook transport helicopters and 
AH-64 Apache attack helicopters instead of the ASW and mine countermeasure aircraft 
that she was designed to accommodate. Hyuga’s crew also gained first-hand experience 
launching and recovering U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Ospreys.151  
E. CONCLUSION 
From the Japanese MoD’s perspective, “as a maritime state, enhancing ‘Open and 
Stable Seas’ and securing the safety of maritime and air traffic constitutes the foundation 
of the peace and prosperity of Japan.”152 This simple premise formed the foundation of 
Japanese defense strategy during the Cold War and survives today. The difference 
between the two eras is in the nature and origin of the threat. Although North Korea 
receives due attention in many Japanese strategic documents, the hermit regime remains 
largely contained, threatening Japan only with ballistic missiles that the MoD is actively 
working to negate with reliable defenses. The real challenge for Japanese strategy is the 
increasing assertiveness of Chinese claims to disputed islands and the accompanying 
regional destabilization. China’s reaction to Japanese defense developments has been 
predictable: one Xinhua News Agency editorial argued that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 
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government is “[distorting] Japan’s history of aggression in a bid to challenge the post-
war international order,” and “[igniting] the tension between the two countries to justify 
the expansion of Japan’s military powerhouse.”153   
Japan may not need a carrier strike capability yet, but a shifting regional strategic 
environment, offensive trends in recent Japanese defense policy, and a softening of 
Japanese public and political adherence to the peace constitution suggest the possibility 
of fixed-wing carrier aviation in the future. A 2012 public opinion survey indicates that 
Japanese citizens are increasingly in favor of a stronger JSDF: the number of respondents 
that believe the JSDF contributes to international stability increased seven percent since a 
similar poll in 2009 while ten percent more favor increasing JSDF capabilities and eleven 
percent more answered that the JSDF should focus on preventing invasion.154 The most 
significant indication of changing Japanese security perceptions, however, is Abe’s 
decision to reinterpret Japan’s ban on collective self-defense: a move that was preceded 
by a public relations campaign and is considered likely to survive Japan’s legislative 
process.155  
The future of Japanese carrier aviation will continue to depend on Japan’s 
recognized security requirements. As to speculation that the JSDF will acquire F-35Bs 
and turn its four DDHs into light, fixed-wing carriers, Koda argues that it is unlikely 
without a reasonable need. If Japan does acquire STOVL fighters, their integration with 
the DDHs—at least procedurally for crisis response if not permanently—would provide 
options to commanders and policy makers, but the primarily ASW and C2 oriented 
DDHs were not designed with jets in mind. “In the future,” reasons Koda, “should Japan, 
in a changed security environment, need a (light) aircraft carrier within the scope of the 
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nation’s constitution, it should build one.”156 Currently, Japanese fixed-wing aircraft are 
able to cover the southwestern islands from existing airfields, and confidence in the 
operational relationship with U.S. carrier-based forces remains in-place. Until Japan 
identifies a clear need for maritime strike or fighter aircraft that cannot be satisfied using 
existing force structures, JMSDF carrier aviation will remain limited to ASW and 
amphibious support roles.     
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V. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA NAVY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The swirling debate on the true role of carriers in previously carrier-free navies is 
being repeated in South Korea. On October 11, 2013, South Korean National Assembly 
Representative Chung Hee-soo commented on an ROKN light carrier feasibility study: 
“To cope with potential maritime disputes with neighboring countries, we need to secure 
aircraft carriers as soon as possible. For more active international peacekeeping 
operations, our navy should have carriers.”157 Chung’s comments are the first public 
record of current ROKN carrier aspirations, and, citing Chung, journalist Jung Sung-ki 
lists “three phases” of carrier development:  
The first is to equip the second ship of the Dokdo-class landing platform 
helicopter ship (LPH) with a ski ramp to operate short-range or vertical 
take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft. . . . Second, the Navy could build an 
amphibious assault ship, similar to the Spanish Navy’s Juan Carlos, 
before 2019. Finally, the service aims to build two 30,000-ton light aircraft 
carriers between 2028 and 2036. . . . The carrier is to have specifications 
similar to the Italian aircraft carrier Cavour, which can support about 30 
aircraft.158  
While it is unclear what Chung intended by referencing international 
peacekeeping operations, Jung also reports that, according to an anonymous ROKN 
source, South Korean carriers are a response to PLAN and JMSDF naval programs.159 
Adding a third voice to the debate during his confirmation hearing as Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, ROKN Admiral Choi Yoon-hee gave a more practical assessment: 
“We should have capabilities to deter North Korea, and at the same time, we need 
minimal capabilities to respond to potential threats from neighboring countries.”160 
Unfortunately, the interim feasibility study in question, which could settle many 
                                                 






questions being asked by outside observers, is not available for public review, and 
analysis of ROKN intentions for light carriers must be based on past South Korean 
debates on naval strategy and power projection. Against the backdrop of those debates, 
Choi’s assessment hits closest to the mark: ROKN force composition—and any decision 
on the future of a light carrier force—will be determined by the competing requirements 
to protect the South from North Korea while hedging against the growing capabilities of 
both China and Japan. This chapter examines the ROKN’s historical approach to naval 
power projection, its new strategic concerns, and the utility of carriers for striking a 
balance between emerging and traditional threats. 
B. SOUTH KOREA’S HISTORICAL APPROACH TO NAVAL POWER 
PROJECTION 
It is understandable that deterrence of North Korea through land and air forces has 
dominated South Korean defense strategy since the early days of the Cold War, but 
Prospects for U.S.-Korean Naval Relations in the 21st Century—the summary of a 
combined 1994 conference between the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Korea 
Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA)—indicates that the prospect of aircraft carriers is 
not new in South Korean strategic thought. According to the CNA summary, the strategic 
problems of 1994 were remarkably similar to those of 2014. Korean attendees were wary 
of potential arms races among major East Asian countries and “questioned the longevity 
of America’s military presence” in East Asia based on “a declining trend in defense 
budgets.”161 Interestingly, many CNA participants were eager to consider prospects for 
increased Korean regional engagement following a hypothetical reunification of the two 
Koreas while KIDA participants “concentrated on the continuing threat from North 
Korea . . . [and] were less likely to accept scenarios and defense policies in which North 
Korea played no role.”162  
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The summary records one South Korean attendee stating that the “fundamental 
objective of ROK naval strategy in the present situation and in the near future is to carry 
out operations to deter and defend against North Korean maritime provocations,” and the 
CNA acknowledged North Korean strengths in submarine and mine warfare while noting 
the difficulty of defending more than 3,000 islands and a coastline more than eight times 
the length of the demilitarized zone (DMZ).163 In addition, the asymmetric naval threat 
posed by North Korea has always been high. In addition to numerous battles between 
North and South Korean patrol craft, fishing vessels, and intelligence ships along the 
maritime Northern Limit Line (NLL) since the 1970s, North Korea seized the USS 
Pueblo and landed a company-size unit of commandoes on the east coast of South Korea 
in 1968, North Korean patrol craft seized a South Korean ship near the NLL in 1970, two 
North Korean agents were discovered on the South’s east coast in 1982, twelve South 
Korean fishermen and their vessel were captured by the North in 1987, and a North 
Korean submarine inserted 26 commandoes into the South in 1996. 1998 was a 
particularly active year for naval special operations: South Korea captured a Northern 
midget submarine tangled in fishing nets off of Sokcho, the body of a North Korean 
combat diver was recovered on a Southern beach, the ROKN forced a North Korean craft 
to abort either an infiltration or exfiltration attempt near Kanghwa Island, and a North 
Korean semi-submersible and at least one combat diver was lost near Pusan.164 
The primacy of the North Korean threat remained at the forefront of the South 
Korean perspective throughout the CNA conference although fears of U.S. 
disengagement played a role. CNA participants—assuming the regional withdrawal of 
the U.S. in the post-Cold War environment—urged South Korean planners to consider 
the ROKN’s inability to address regional problems outside the Korean littoral, and one 
KIDA member argued that it was precisely the U.S. Navy’s presence in the region that 
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had inhibited the development of the ROKN into the blue-water navy that it needed to 
become.165 Within this context, the first mention of ROKN carriers emerges: 
The same participant argued for the inclusion of two small aircraft carriers 
in a small but modern and effective fleet, within two decades. . . . Most 
U.S. participants were less enthusiastic about having the ROK Navy 
procure aircraft carriers. Along with some Korean participants, they were 
concerned with the regional implications of such a move, and had 
difficulty seeing how carriers would serve any practical Korean naval 
purpose. One participant suggested that both the Chinese and Japanese 
would be seriously concerned if the ROK Navy acquired carriers or other 
significant power-projection capability.166  
It appears that the CNA participants were caught in a contradiction, prodding 
South Korea to look past the deadlock along the DMZ and toward a future in which a 
unified Korea looks outward with a blue-water navy after the United States has said 
farewell. However, aircraft carriers were apparently not what the CNA had in mind when 
calling for a regionally powerful, self-sufficient Korea, although it is difficult to imagine 
why Japan and China would have acquiesced to a blue-water ROKN surface and 
submarine fleet but drawn a line over two light carriers.  
What is more important, however, is that the majority of KIDA participants 
remained fixed on the more immediate North Korean threat despite the prospect of U.S. 
withdrawal. In addition to the need for South Korean ground and air forces to maintain 
working and complimentary relationships with their U.S. counterparts in case of another 
North Korean invasion; mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and coastal protection 
against irregular threats and infiltration remained high on the KIDA list of priorities for 
the ROKN. Although one KIDA participant was willing to test the waters on a blue-
water, power-projecting fleet, others doubted the efficiency of using carrier aircraft to 
support ground operations against North Korea compared to aircraft originating on the 
peninsula. U.S. and South Korean strategic perceptions were drifting apart in 1994. The 
U.S. envisioned a reunified Korea and post-Cold War stability that would allow the 
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return of forward deployed forces; South Korea remained fixed on the ever-present and 
hostile North despite its ally’s call to begin thinking about new regional roles.167         
C. SOUTH KOREA’S NEW STRATEGIC CONCERNS 
The prospect of Korean reunification is not a topic that appears often in 
contemporary strategic literature. Much has transpired since 1994, including North 
Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, and it seems that U.S. post-Cold War optimism was only a 
momentary lapse. Fears of an Asian arms race and tightening U.S. defense spending 
remain. The difference now, however, is that there is real evidence of Chinese and 
Japanese naval buildups. U.S. participants at the 1994 CNA conference countered their 
KIDA counterparts’ concerns about East Asian arms races with faith in regional 
economic ties and “the preoccupation of most [East Asian] countries with internal 
problems.”168 While all states have internal problems of greater or lesser extent, whole 
books have been written in recent years about Asian military expansion, especially 
China’s outward looking foreign policy and naval modernization. Wedged between the 
stomping grounds of the PLAN and JMSDF, South Korea now has good reason to 
consider the need for a more capable, blue-water navy.169 
By 2012, Korean reunification was no longer high on the CNA’s list of concerns, 
and the economic ties promoted by conference attendees in 1994 were not enough to 
overpower the strategic implications of regional naval modernization. Considering 
China’s rise, CNA analyst Terence Roehrig writes 
despite the strong economic ties and common interests, South Korea also 
has some anxiety regarding its relations with China. Some of the concerns 
include trepidation over China’s overall strategic direction . . . The South 
Korean Navy does not appear to have made any specific operational 
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changes in response to its concerns but its development of a blue water 
navy continues in part with an eye towards China.170 
Contemporary China presents several problems for South Korea: regional destabilization 
due to unpredictable policy decisions such as the 2013 East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ), EEZ and territorial disputes over islands such as the Ieodo 
reef, and various forms of Chinese political support for North Korea.171  
China, of course, is not the only extra-peninsula concern. The dispute with Japan 
over the Liancourt Rocks is ongoing and fed by deep-rooted mistrust between the two 
countries resulting from the Second World War. In addition, South Korea is 
economically—although not literally—an island. Just as Japan is dependent on the 
security of SLOCs for economic vitality and wartime survival, South Korea is dependent 
on sea lanes that can be threatened by North Korean submarines and mines, the PLAN, 
and—theoretically but not constitutionally—the JMSDF.  South Korea, therefore, must 
now contend with the potential vulnerability of its SLOCs and maritime territorial 
disputes with both China and Japan on top of its traditional security problems with North 
Korea.172 
Prior to 2010, the challenges described above seemed to tip South Korean 
strategic planning in favor of a strengthened, blue-water ROKN. In 2001, President Kim 
Dae-Jung endorsed ROKN blue-water development, and Defense Reform Plan 2020 
(DRP 2020) established a framework for naval modernization and enlargement in 2005 
while calling for an overall reduction in the strength of ROK ground and air forces due to 
a perceived reduction in the likelihood of war with the North. In response, South Korean 
shipyards prepared to fill ROKN contracts.173 
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The loss of the ROKN corvette Cheonan and forty-six South Korean sailors on 
March 26, 2010, near Baengnyeong Island to a North Korean torpedo marked the demise 
of DRP 2020, and, together with the artillery barrage of Yeonpyeong Island that killed 
four and wounded eighteen South Korean civilians and marines later that year, forced 
policy makers to reevaluate the South’s defense priorities. According to Roehrig, “The 
[Cheonan] tragedy was a reminder of the DPRK maritime threat and the need for a 
stronger coastal defense, particularly ROK anti-submarine capability and readiness.”174 
DRP 2020 was in jeopardy as early as 2009 when President Lee Myung-bak appointed a 
commission to reevaluate the plan’s assumptions, but the Cheonan sinking contributed 
significantly to the commission’s result: Defense Reform Plan 307 (DRP 307).175 
According to South Korean Deputy Defense Minister for Policy Chang Gwang Il in 2011, 
the people of South Korea suffered much anguish from the tragic ROKS 
Cheonan and YP-do shelling incidents last year. These unfortunate events 
did, however, provide us with an opportunity to review and improve the 
‘Defense Reform 2020.’ Considering the changes in the security threats 
and military environments of the Korean peninsula, ROK MND 
announced a revised and more realistic version . . . on March 8
th
, the 
‘Defense Reform 307 Plan.’176 
Of the three major changes spelled out in DRP 307, the switch to proactive 
deterrence is the most significant for discussions of ROKN power projection. Prior to 
2011, South Korea adhered to a passive strategy known as defense by denial, which 
sought to avoid escalation by ruling out retaliatory or punitive strikes in response to 
reckless North Korean provocations. Rhee Sang-Woo argues, however, that  
this approach not only constrains the ability of the South Korean forces to 
shape a more favorable battlefield environment, but also allows the North 
Korean forces to enjoy operational freedom by choosing the location and 
timing of attacks. Under this scenario, the [South Korean armed forces] 
will be drawn into combat against its will, and at strategic disadvantage.177  
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Through proactive deterrence, South Korean forces will respond to both the Northern 
Korean units engaged in the use of force and units serving in a support role.178  
South Korea’s northwestern islands receive special attention under proactive 
deterrence. According to Chang, “the Northwest Islands Defense Command will be 
initiated with the ROK Marine Corps Command as the body. . . . With the aid of the 
Northwest Defense Command, the ROK military will be able to secure dominance over 
the northwest islands and effectively respond against North Korea’s attempt to nullify the 
NLL.”179 After the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents, it appears that South 
Korea has had enough of North Korea’s four-decade long campaign against the Yellow 
Sea NLL. 
D. STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN EMERGING AND TRADITIONAL 
THREATS 
Roehrig points out  
the [2010] attacks reminded military planners that despite South Korea’s 
global interests and ambitions, there remain crucial defense priorities close 
to home. . . . The issue is one of balance, and ROK leaders continue to 
assess and struggle with where to draw the line between coastal defense 
and a blue-water navy to achieve the proper balance.180  
Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island did not erase the strategic problems recognized in 
2005’s DRP 2020: they merely postponed South Korea’s response to them. Given the 
need to grapple with global export-oriented economic interests and regional naval 
developments while still holding the littoral line against a recalcitrant North Korea, how 
can the ROKN frame a potential investment in light carriers? This question was also 
debated in 1994, although not directly. One KIDA proposal that emerged from the 
conference was for  
improvements in ROKN force projection in its capability to close enemy 
SLOCs, its capability to wage mine warfare against major ports of the 
enemy, its combat capability to protect ports and coastal areas based on a 
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sea-denial strategy, and its surface fleet combat and core strike 
capabilities.181  
The CNA added an argument in favor of maintaining amphibious forces that could “flank 
an invading North Korean army.”182  
While all of these suggestions were intended as counters to North Korea, several 
are now potential dual-use concepts in the evolving East Asian strategic environment. 
First, carrier-based surveillance and light attack aircraft could augment ROKN surface 
and subsurface campaigns to close North Korean SLOCs through the Sea of Japan and 
the Yellow Sea: a function that could be applied to other regional SLOCs, presumably in 
concert with the U.S. Navy, under circumstances not involving North Korea. Second, the 
need to protect South Korean ports and coastal areas—a paramount requirement for 
enabling U.S. assistance during renewed, large-scale hostilities on the peninsula—could 
be satisfied by carrier-based ASW and mine countermeasures aircraft in coordination 
with land-based maritime patrol assets: an arrangement modelled on the JMSDF’s DDH 
operating concept and applicable in any scenario in which South Korea’s own SLOCs are 
threatened. Third, carriers have obvious utility within the ROKN’s “core strike 
capabilities.”183 Not only would carrier-based aircraft be able to conduct traditional strike 
missions against peninsula targets or rival regional naval forces far out to sea, but carriers 
could potentially conduct offensive mine warfare against ports and waterways. Finally, a 
South Korean amphibious operation designed to flank an invading North Korean army 
could presumably be conducted beyond the reach of South Korean land-based aircraft, 
requiring sea-based aircraft for close and deep air support, transport, and sustainment. As 
with the PLAN and JMSDF, the same argument for organic, expeditionary air support 
also applies to South Korean maritime territorial contingencies. 
If DRP 307’s proactive deterrence endures, some connection between carrier-
based power projection and retaliatory strike capabilities must be made. According to 
Chang,  
                                                 




Priorities on [DRP 307] force enhancement will focus more on preparing 
local provocations and asymmetric threats. Acquisitions on [sic] 
conventional war forces including mechanized assets will be reduced, and 
subsequently the retrenched resources will be reinvested to acquire new 
forces for effectively countering North Korea submarine threats. Through 
the acquisition of counter artillery detection radars and Joint Direct Attack 
Munition (JDAM), North Korea long range artillery will be destroyed at a 
faster rate, and introducing high-altitude UAVs will enhance our 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.184 
Baengnyeong Island—the site of the Cheonan sinking along the NLL—sits less than 
eight nautical miles from the North Korean mainland but more than seventy from the 
South. Reprisal raids against North Korean forces engaging South Korea’s northwestern 
islands could potentially be conducted more responsively and efficiently from sea-going 
platforms than from airbases on the peninsula. All of the aviation-based priorities cited by 
Chang including ASW, JDAM strike warfare, and ISR are within the capacity of both 
retrofitted Dokdo-class LPHs and the 30,000-ton light carriers described in Jung’s article 
on the ROKN feasibility study. Their effectiveness, of course, would depend on 
proximity and availability, which could require regular proactive patrols in the Yellow 
Sea. Carriers intended for retaliatory strike missions are even less useful than mainland 
airbases when they are confined to port. South Korean planners may already recognize 
this problem, explaining why two light carriers are planned in addition to retrofitted 
amphibious ships.  
E. CONCLUSION 
South Korean carrier aspirations remain in the early stages, limited to feasibility 
studies and evaluations of security requirements. The Chinese influence on the strategic 
environment is strong, but the primary threat posed by North Korea cannot be ignored. 
Any investment in increased naval power projection will likely have utility on the Korean 
Peninsula in addition to the East China Sea. Fortunately, South Korea’s geographic 
situation makes most naval force structures applicable to both. As Kim Jae-Hwan argues,  
Surrounded on three sides by water, South Korea will inevitably need its 
force to be naval. And while the South’s ability to truly project power 
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beyond the East Asian maritime sphere will be heavily constrained by 
nearby powers as well as by the U.S. naval dominance, Seoul will 
nonetheless work to build a navy capable of deterring immediate 
interference by either China or Japan. Ultimately, South Korea must do 
this because it exists in a region where political fault lines are both deep 
and unstable.185  
The future of ROKN carrier development, however, depends on the perceived 
future of the U.S.-South Korea relationship. As long as U.S. strategic communication 
satisfies South Korean concerns about U.S. commitment to South Korea and the larger 
Asia-Pacific region, then the ROKN will likely remained focused on shielding the South 
from unpredictable Northern aggression. While arguments can be made in favor of more 
autonomous South Korean strike and amphibious warfare capabilities to hedge against 
both North Korea and evolving regional powers, developments in those warfare areas 
will likely proceed within a cooperative, complementary, and cost-conscious framework 
that seeks to leverage the strengths of the U.S. Navy while providing critical 
capabilities—such as coastal protection and mine countermeasures—that are unique 
requirements in the Korean littoral. Representative Chung’s unveiling of the ROKN’s 
carrier feasibility study, however, indicates that South Korean policy makers harbor 
doubts about the strength of U.S. regional commitment. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE AMERICAN DISCONNECT 
In 1975, Roger Waters and David Gilmour lamented “running over the same old 
ground” only to encounter “the same old fears.”186 Although Pink Floyd has long since 
faded from most squadron ready rooms, the sentiment easily applies to the unbreakable 
cycle of U.S. naval procurement. All of the U.S. Navy’s carriers survived the fiscal year 
2015 budget turmoil. Congressional pressure in early 2014 defeated a proposal to retire 
George Washington instead of beginning the ship’s multi-billion dollar mid-career 
nuclear refueling process.187 In addition, the dominance of the super-carrier as the 
embodiment of U.S. naval power projection and global reach is virtually guaranteed for 
decades to come as construction on the Gerald R. Ford-class (CVN-78) pushes ahead 
despite alarming cost growth. The Congressional Research Service reports, “the 
estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78 and 79 have grown 22.9% and 25.1% 
respectively” with an additional 1.3 billion dollars requested for fiscal years 2014 to 2016 
to cover cost growth.188  
The influence of domestic political interests over difficult—but necessary—
decisions concerning U.S. defense spending is disturbing enough, but even more 
troubling is the U.S. Navy’s insistence on pursuing grossly expensive weapon systems 
with little consideration for their applicability in meeting national strategic objectives. 
Although Assistant Secretary of the Navy Sean Stackley admits that Ford-class cost 
growth is “unacceptable,” very little effort has been expended to explain how super-
carriers will address the strategic problems of the future, nor how their anticipated costs 
can be rendered acceptable relative to those problems.189 The blame does not rest with 
force-structure planners or the military-industrial base. If asked to consider the purpose of 
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super-carriers in U.S. national and military strategic objectives, the answer appears at 
once obvious yet elusive. Super-carrier proponents can correctly argue that the varied and 
unpredictable nature of American military activities and global commitments require U.S. 
naval forces to maintain flexible, multi-purpose assets capable of responding to a diverse 
range of contingencies. Unfortunately, poorly-articulated strategic guidance and 
persistent fiscal constraints will force the U.S. Navy to invest available funding in 
platforms and doctrinal concepts that push the limits of practicality while trying to meet 
possible yet highly unlikely strategic scenarios. The U.S. Navy is required to plan for the 
use of force in pursuit of national objectives whose future character is unknown. Its 
historical preference for highly capable ships, and especially the modern super-carrier, is 
a form of insurance against that uncertainty. One may argue about whether or not such 
insurance is worth the cost, but it is important to recognize that American carriers reflect 
a strategic agnosticism that may not be shared by other navies.  
U.S. naval aviation is focused on technocratic problems rather than strategy and 
doctrine. A section titled “Where We Are Going” in the 2012 edition of the Naval 
Aviation Vision praises new airframes and systems for promising “increased sortie 
generation rates, reduced manning, and lower total ownership costs.”190 Similarly the 
Vision’s “Transformation Roadmap” for U.S. super-carriers focuses on technological 
features such as “improved nuclear reactors,” “distributed systems,” and increased 
“electrical generating capacity” while references to displacement growth margins, 
operational analytical modeling, performance parameters, theory of constraints, barrier 
removal teams, and Kaizen initiatives force readers to wonder if vision is an appropriate 
title.191 
The tendency of American strategic thinking to devolve into reflections on 
emerging technology can create a misleading frame of reference for evaluating the role of 
carrier aviation in other navies. It is certainly a mistake to dismiss such efforts as 
strategically irrelevant because the platforms involved do not measure up to their U.S. 
counterparts. Comparisons to super-carriers are fruitless because Asian carriers are not 
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intended for the same nebulous purposes. It must also be recognized that carriers remain 
relevant because Asian navies believe that they are relevant: a belief reflected in the 
creatively adaptive carrier programs that could change the way power is projected in the 
Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Asian carrier navies do not suffer from the 
technocratic tendencies that afflict the United States. Each carrier program examined by 
this paper is designed to meet specific strategic problems. China’s intentions remain 
largely obscured leading to a fair amount of speculation concerning the role of PLAN 
carriers. China’s involvement in regional maritime territorial disputes and its strategic 
interpretation of Western Pacific geography suggest that any investment in naval power 
projection instruments will support a desire for operational freedom of action within the 
First Island Chain. India recognized the utility of strike carriers early in its post-colonial 
history and recently articulated its intention to achieve regional manifest destiny in the 
face of increasing naval competition from China. India’s vision suffers from some of the 
same diffuseness of the U.S. model that it attempts to emulate, but is simultaneously 
easier to manage because of its smaller scope and acknowledged adversaries. Japan’s 
gradual revival as a regional military power may have been inevitable in the absence of 
the Soviet threat and the U.S. regional engagement that accompanied it, but China’s 
increasingly assertive actions over island territories has accelerated the JMSDF’s 
development into a limited power projection force. Finally, South Korea—while not yet 
committed to fixed-wing carrier acquisition—is likely exploring options for managing its 
precarious position between North Korea, China, and Japan.      
The rise of carriers in Asia is rooted in the particular geopolitics of the region and 
should not be labeled a classic arms race. Although China’s military build-up is a shared 
concern for India, Japan, and South Korea, no state is building carriers simply in response 
to another state’s carriers. Instead, carriers fulfill individual state strategic needs that are 
emerging in the larger context of the post-Cold War strategic environment. That these 
states are identifying new strategic problems and acting to address them in ground-
breaking ways is far more important than fretting over the decline of any imaginary U.S. 
carrier monopoly.  
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Accordingly, there is no need to interpret Asian carrier developments as a 
challenge to U.S. dominance in naval aviation, power projection, or freedom-of-action, 
but the implications for U.S. influence and strategic relationships in the Asia-Pacific 
region should be considered. Although the U.S.-Japan alliance remains strong, policy 
makers should note that Japan’s drift away from constitutional pacifism, coupled with its 
newly felt need for tactically offensive amphibious capabilities, could indicate waning 
confidence in the U.S. commitment to maintain the integrity of Japanese administered 
territories. Similarly, South Korea’s eye toward the wider region despite persistent 
problems with the North may stem from a perception that the future of American regional 
presence is uncertain. Indian aspirations in the IOR present an opportunity for the United 
States, which has historically risen only half-heartedly to the prospect of an Indo-
American strategic relationship. U.S. guidance could move Indian naval expansion in 
directions that compliment U.S. interests instead of leaving the Indian Navy to its own 
devices and hoping that the two countries will always see eye-to-eye. 
In its only attempt to connect means and ends, the U.S. Naval Aviation Vision 
offers the following for consideration: 
To meet the demands of 21
st
-century warfare, Nimitz and Ford-class 
aircraft carriers will deploy long-range manned and unmanned strike 
aircraft. Advanced weapons and sensors, combined with high-speed sealift 
platforms, tilt-rotor aircraft, and advanced amphibious assault vehicles, 
will generate more flexible combat power. Joint concepts of operation, 
centered on the aircraft carrier, will leverage the military strengths of all 
the services, bringing cooperative muscle to the fight and a potent synergy 
across the warfare continuum.192 
The reliance on systems and platforms, and the implied confidence that—strategically 
speaking—their capabilities somehow speak for themselves, is unmistakable. Terms such 
as long-range, high-speed, advanced, flexible, joint, cooperative, synergy, and continuum 
are evidence of the U.S. Navy’s need to demonstrate the ability to address any strategic 
problem while comprehensively preparing for none in particular. That may be the 
inescapable reality for the United States for the time being, but officers and policy 
                                                 
192 Ibid., 17. 
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makers should remain vigilantly aware that other navies, including potential adversaries, 
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